Emotion, Desire, and Morality

  • Mark F. Carr
Part of the Philosophical Studies in Contemporary Culture book series (PSCC, volume 8)


While temperance may not be widely appreciated, emotion is a topic of vast appeal and importance in the moral life. Emphasis on the analysis of emotion in this chapter will lie in the areas of psychology and morality.


Cognitive Theory Moral Agent Moral Virtue Moral Life Nicomachean Ethic 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mark F. Carr
    • 1
  1. 1.Faculty of ReligionLoma Linda UniversityLoma LindaUSA

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