What Is an Illocutionary Point?

  • Mark Siebel
Part of the Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy book series (SLAP, volume 79)


There are many different things a person can do in making an utterance. By uttering “Come on, let’s take part in the twist contest!”, Mia might ask Vincent to dance with her, frighten him because he does not like to dance in public, call his attention to the contest, and so on. One of the tasks of speech act theory is to sort these things out in a satisfactory way. John Searle’s taxonomy is the most famous attempt at classifying an important class of speech acts, namely illocutionary acts.


Propositional Content Sincerity Condition Constitutive Rule Illocutionary Force Declarative Class 
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© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2002

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  • Mark Siebel

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