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The Classical Model of Rationality and its Weaknesses

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Part of the book series: Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy ((SLAP,volume 79))

Abstract

In our intellectual culture, we have a quite specific tradition of discussing rationality and practical reason, rationality in action. This tradition goes back to Aristotle’s claim that deliberation is always about means, never about ends, it continues in Hume’s famous claim that, “Reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions”, and in Kant’s claim that, “He who wills the end wills the means”. The tradition receives its most sophisticated formulation in contemporary mathematical decision-theory. The tradition is by no means unified, and I would not wish to suggest that Aristotle, Hume, and Kant share the same conception of rationality. On the contrary, there are striking differences between them. But there is a common thread, and I believe that of the classical philosophers, Hume gives the clearest statement of what I will be referring to as “the Classical Model”. I have for a long time had doubts about this tradition and I am going to spend most of this essay exposing some of its main features and making a preliminary statement of some of my doubts.

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Notes

  1. Nozick, Robert. The Nature of Rationality. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993: Ch I.

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  2. For an anthology see Mortimore, G.W. (ed.). Weakness of Will. London: Macmillan St. Martin’s Press, 1971.

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  3. Reason in Human Affairs. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1983: 7–8.

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  4. Human Society in Ethics and Politics. London, Allen and Unwin, 1954: viii.

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  5. Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983: 4.

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  6. Carroll, Lewis. “What Achilles Said to the Tortoise.” Mind (1895).

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  7. For an example of this claim see Railton, Peter. “On the Hypothetical and the Non-Hypothetical in Reasoning about Belief and Action.” pp. 53–79 in Cullity, G. and Gaut, B., Ethics and Practical Reason. Oxford, OUP.1997: 76-79.

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  8. Davidson, Donald. “How is Weakness of the Will Possible?” Essays on Actions and Events. Clarendon Press, Oxford, Oxford University Press, New York, 1980.

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  9. Hare, R. M. The Language of Morals. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952.

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  10. “External and Internal Reasons” reprinted in his Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973–1980. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981: 101–113.

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  11. Hume. Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford: Oxford, 1888: 416.

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© 2002 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Searle, J.R. (2002). The Classical Model of Rationality and its Weaknesses. In: Grewendorf, G., Meggle, G. (eds) Speech Acts, Mind, and Social Reality. Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy, vol 79. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0589-0_21

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0589-0_21

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4020-0861-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-010-0589-0

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