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Adaptive Logics for Non-Explanatory and Explanatory Diagnostic Reasoning

  • Dagmar Provijn
  • Erik Weber
Part of the Applied Logic Series book series (APLS, volume 25)

Abstract

In this paper we discuss diagnosis of faults in systems. The latter are understood as structured wholes of components. Three types of diagnosis can be distinguished and are defined: non-explanatory, weak explanatory and strong explanatory. After the analysis of the reasoning process that leads to non-explanatory diagnosis, we argue that the predicative adaptive logic D* is an adequate tool for modeling this kind of diagnostic reasoning. Subsequently, we follow the same pattern for weak and strong diagnosis and describe the logic D* which adequately formalizes weak diagnostic reasoning, even when underlying theoretical knowledge is taken into account. Finally it is argued that the same logic can be applied in the case of strong diagnostic reasoning whenever a number of conditions are fulfilled.

Keywords

Line Number Reasoning Process Closed Formula Diagnostic Reasoning Limit Logic 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Dagmar Provijn
    • 1
  • Erik Weber
  1. 1.Centre for Logic and Philosophy of ScienceGhent UniversityGhentBelgium

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