A Nominalist Ontology of the Passions

  • Vesa Hirvonen
Part of the Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind book series (SHPM, volume 1)

Abstract

Ockham uses the term ‘passion’(passio)in several ways. Some of them refer to the phenomena in human beings and animals which he calls appetitive and which he distinguishes from cognitive phenomena. Terms like ‘desire’(desiderium), ‘love’(amor)and ‘delight’(delectatio)refer to particular passions. Therefore, passions in this sense are more or less what are nowadays called ‘emotions’ or ‘affections’. Ockham’s most extensive treatments of the passions are in (1) theExposition of Aristotle’s Categories (Expositio in librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis), c. 14, (2) theExposition of Aristotle’s Physics (Expositio in libros Physicorum Aristotelis),VII, c. 4, (3) theCommentary on the Third Book of the Sentences (Quaestiones in librum tertium Sententiarum,Reportatio,III), q. 12, (4) theQuodlibetal Questions (Quodlibeta septem), II, q. 15, and (5) theQuodlibetal Questions, II, q. 17.2My purpose is to give a presentation of those treatments, and, based on them, try to decide what Ockham understands by passions, where they are located in humans, and which passions or passion types there are. I pay special attention to the passions of the will since they have been almost totally neglected in research.

Keywords

Posit Sine Tate Tria Defend 

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2002

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  • Vesa Hirvonen

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