Reflections on John Duns Scotus on the Will

Abstract

John Duns Scotus’s honorific title ofDoctor subtilissimaeis well-earned, and no definitive account of his positions is possible without entering into the intricacies of his reasoning. But as with any highly technical theory (as in particle physics or neurophysiology), there is still something to be gained by translating its advanced results back into descriptions closer to ordinary experience. What I hope to do with my disingenuous approach is to try to clarify some of the issues involved in (especially recent) debates about Scotus’s moral psychology. The issues I shall take up are: whether Scotus is best classified as a libertarian or compatibilist; what the relation is between his doctrines of dual affections in the will and of the superabundant sufficiency of the will and how his account of will affects the character of morality.

Where possible, I have given references to critical editions of Scotus: John Duns Scotus, Opera Omnia (abbreviated as “Vat.” followed by volume/page) or John Duns Scotus, Opera Philosophica, eds. R. Andrews et aI., vols. 3 & 4, (abbreviated as “Op. Phil.” followed by volume/page). Where not, reference is made to: John Duns Scotus, Opera Omnia, ed. L. Wadding. (abbreviated by “Wad.” followed by volume/page). Wolter (1987), a LatinEnglish collection of texts, often has improvements even on the critical edition. I cite it whenever possible because it is also generally available and accessible (abbreviated as “W&M”). I have also referenced Wolter (1962) an earlier Latin-English collection he edited. I have also used the translation Alluntis & Wolter (1975) (ahbreviated as “G&C”). I have used standard abbreviations for Scotus’s works: “Lect.” for Lectura, “Ord.” for Ordinalio, “Rep.” for Reportata examinata, “Quod!.” for Quodlibeta, “Q. in Metaph.,” for Quaestiones Super Libros Melaphysicorum Arislolelis. And I have used initial letters to indicate: distinction. part, question and note.