Goodness and Rational Choice in the Early Middle Ages

Abstract

Twentieth-century discussion of the history of the notions of will was domi-nated by debates about whether free choice is compatible with efficient causal determinism. One consequence of this was that a related but distinct issue — whether free choice is compatible with determination by final causes and, in particular, compatible with thegivennessof ends of action — was largely ignored. It was not always so. In late Antiquity and the early Middle Ages debates about the nature of choice centered as much (if not more) on the issue ofrational determinismthan on its efficient causal cousin. The aim of this paper is to trace part of the story of the evolution of discussion of this issue and of the evolution of conceptions of choice and of freedom which paralleled it.

I would like to thank the Dept. of Philosophy at the University of Queensland for its hospitality during much of the writing of this paper and the editors of this volume for their patience. My interest in the themes of this paper was sparked by conversations with Prof. Lilli Alanen about the background of Descartes’ conception of choice.