What is Wrong with Fallacies?

Abstract

The problem of normativity concerns the problem of what enforces the distinction between right and wrong; true and false; good and bad; etc. The question is what accounts for such normative distinctions. As all of these distinctions are debatable (at least from a human perspective), we can see them as outcomes of discussions. We might therefore generalize the problem as a matter of evaluating arguments and concentrate on the distinction between good and bad arguments. To understand this ‘mechanism of normativity,’ both good and bad arguments are of interest. For ages, however, bad arguments were philosophically virtually neglected. Logic was concerned with good arguments that provided support for the conclusion and bad arguments simply did not. Much like St. Augustin’s understanding of evil as privatio boni, a bad argument had the status of privatio demonstrationis.¹ Consequently, no separate study of fallacious argumentation was necessary. Fallacies were simply considered the complement of valid inference, and deserved no special treatment of their own.