Truth; What is the Problem?

Abstract

Truth is a central notion in philosophy. Perhaps that is as close to a communis opinio as we can get on the issue. Despite its centrality, or perhaps because of it, the notion of truth has not often been systematically surveyed. Despite its centrality, or perhaps because of it, the notion of truth is not a perspicuous one at all. Richard L. Kirkham, who had the courage to scrutinize theories of truth, complains that the notion suffers from a ‘four-dimensional confusion.’¹ He argues that philosophers are vague in describing truth, particularly when it comes to the question of what truth is. They are prone to confuse the question of what truth is with other questions, for instance how to find a criterion of truth, resulting in the second confusion of ambiguity. Conversely, the third confusion, philosophers do not always acknowledge that different descriptions in fact serve the same purpose. And the fourth confusion consists in thinking that one theory can satisfy different projects of truth without properly distinguishing them. As anyone dealing with the issue can confirm, it is difficult to get a grip on the problem of truth.