Abstract
The objective of the negotiations of the Ad Hoc Group is to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)1 through a legally binding instrument. The Convention opened for signature in 1972 and entered into force in 1975 and has been in force for over 25 years. It is a modest document of a few pages in marked contrast to the much more recent Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)2, which opened for signature in 1993 and entered into force in 1997, comprising over 100 pages which elaborate the infrastructure and procedures to be followed in implementing the CWC as well as specifying in Article VII the measures to be adopted nationally by States Parties in order to implement their obligations under the Convention. The infrastructure, regulations and procedures are consequently fundamental to the effective implementation of the regime and to the achievement of the purposes of the regime.
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Notes
United Nations, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, General Assembly resolution 2826 (XXVI), 16 December 1971. Available at http://www.opbw.org
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Chemical Weapons Convention, available at http://www.opcw.org
The CBW Conventions Bulletin, A Draft Convention to Prohibit Biological and Chemical Weapons Under International Criminal Law, Issue No 42, December 1998, pp. 1–5. See also http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~hsp/crim01.pdf
See Annex B in United Nations, Procedural Report of the Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/56, 18 May 2001, Geneva. Available at http://www.opbw.org
The Convention also provides for verification by challenge, in which virtually any site may be inspected by the OPCW Technical Secretariat if the prescribed procedures for triggering such visits have been followed. But these measures can only be activated by States Parties, not by the OPCW.
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© 2002 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Perry Robinson, J.P., Pearson, G.S. (2002). Maximizing Security Benefits from Technical Cooperation In Microbiology and Biotechnology: Infrastructure, Regulations and Procedures. In: Dando, M.R., Klement, C., Negut, M., Pearson, G.S. (eds) Maximizing the Security and Development Benefits from the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. NATO Science Series, vol 36. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0472-5_15
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0472-5_15
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