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Non-Proliferation and other Security-Related Issues Associated with the Dismantling of Nuclear Vessels in North-West Russia

  • O. Reistad
  • A. Soerlie
Part of the NATO Science Series book series (NAIV, volume 22)

Abstract

Nuclear safety has been in the focus for international cooperation on Russian general purpose nuclear submarine dismantling. Even if the presence of security-related issues has been admitted, the threshold for discussing these issues openly outside the scope of disarmament has been high. This paper suggests, on the basis of technical analysis, site descriptions of Russian naval sites and previous experience in dealing with similar issues for Russian civilian ships, that security-related threats should come more in the forefront when considering submarine dismantlement. In addition, the results of the Russian/ Swedish/ Norwegian governmental cooperation on similar issues are presented.

Keywords

International Atomic Energy Agency Radioactive Waste Nuclear Material Spend Fuel Spend Nuclear Fuel 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • O. Reistad
    • 1
  • A. Soerlie
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Radiation Protection and Nuclear SafetyNorwegian Radiation Protection AuthorityOesteraasNorway

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