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Stochastic Games in Economics and Related Fields: An Overview

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Stochastic Games and Applications

Part of the book series: NATO Science Series ((ASIC,volume 570))

Abstract

This survey provides an extensive account of research in economics based on the stochastic games paradigm. Its area-by-area coverage is in the form of an overview, and includes applications in resource economics, industrial organization, macroeconomics, market games, and experimental and empirical economics. As to methodologically defined frameworks, the coverage is somewhat more detailed (to the extent that the material is not covered elsewhere in this volume), and includes the open-loop concept, the linear-quadratic model, myopic equilibrium, games of perfect information, and stochastic games with a continuum of players. It is hoped that the survey might be useful as a general guide both to economists and to game theorists.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Université Catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium

    Rabah Amir

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  1. Rabah Amir
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Mathematics and Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel

    Abraham Neyman

  2. Université Pierre et Marie Curie and École Polytechnique, Paris, France

    Sylvain Sorin

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Amir, R. (2003). Stochastic Games in Economics and Related Fields: An Overview. In: Neyman, A., Sorin, S. (eds) Stochastic Games and Applications. NATO Science Series, vol 570. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0189-2_30

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0189-2_30

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4020-1493-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-010-0189-2

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