Absorbing Games with a Signalling Structure

  • Jean-Michel Coulomb
Conference paper
Part of the NATO Science Series book series (ASIC, volume 570)


The perfect monitoring assumption is replaced by a signalling structure that models, for each player, the information about the opponent’s previous action. The value of a stochastic game may not exist any more. For the class of absorbing games, we are able to show the existence of the max min and the min max. The value does not exist if they are different.


Game Theory Empirical Distribution Average Payoff Signalling Structure Stochastic Game 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jean-Michel Coulomb
    • 1
  1. 1.The University of YorkYorkUK

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