Abstract
In this chapter we will review several topics that are used extensively in the study of n-player stochastic games. These tools were used in the proof of several results on non-zero-sum stochastic games.
Most of the results presented here appeared in [17],[16], and a few appeared in [12],[13].
The first main issue is Markov chains where the transition rule is a Puiseux probability distribution. We define the notion of communicating sets and construct a hierarchy on the collection of these sets. We then relate these concepts to stochastic games, and show several conditions that enable the players to control the exit distribution from communicating sets.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Avsar, Z.M. and Baykal-Gürsoy, M. (1999) A decomposition approach for undiscounted two-person zero-sum stochastic games, Mathematical Methods in Operations Research 3, 483–500.
Bather, J. (1973) Optimal decision procedures for finite Markov chains. Part III: General convex systems, Advances in Applied Probability 5, 541–553.
Bewley, T. and Kohlberg, E. (1976) The asymptotic theory of stochastic games, Mathematics of Operations Research 1, 197–208.
Coulomb, J.M. (2002) Stochastic games without perfect monitoring, mimeo.
Eaves, B.C. and Rothblum, U.G. (1989) A theory on extending algorithms for parametric problems, Mathematics of Operations Research 14, 502–533.
Freidlin, M. and Wentzell, A. (1984) Random Perturbations of Dynamical Systems, Springer-Verlag, Berlin.
Mertens, J.F. and Neyman, A. (1981) Stochastic games, International Journal of Game Theory 10, 53–66.
Neyman, A. (2003) Stochastic games: Existence of the minmax, in A. Neyman and S. Sorin (eds.), Stochastic Games and Applications, NATO Science Series C, Mathematical and Physical Sciences, Vol. 570, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, Chapter 11, pp. 173–193.
Rosenberg, D., Solan, E. and Vieille, N. (2002) Stochastic games with imperfect monitoring, Discussion Paper 1341, The Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Sciences, Northwestern University.
Rosenberg, D., Solan, E. and Vieille, N. (2002) On the maxmin value of stochastic games with imperfect monitoring, Discussion Paper 1344, The Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Sciences, Northwestern University.
Ross, K.W. and Varadarajan, R. (1991) Multichain Markov decision processes with a sample path constraint: A decomposition approach, Mathematics of Operations Research 16, 195–207.
Solan, E. (1999) Three-person absorbing games, Mathematics of Operations Research 24, 669–698.
Solan, E. (2000) Stochastic games with two non-absorbing states, Israel Journal of Mathematics 119, 29–54.
Solan, E. and Vieille, N. (2002), Correlated equilibrium in stochastic games, Games and Economic Behavior 38, 362–399.
Thuijsman, F. (2003) Repeated games with absorbing states, in A. Neyman and S. Sorin (eds.), Stochastic Games and Applications, NATO Science Series C, Mathematical and Physical Sciences, Vol. 570, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, Chapter 13, pp. 205–213.
Vieille, N. (2000) Equilibrium in two-person stochastic games II: The case of recursive games, Israel Journal of Mathematics 119, 93–126.
Vieille, N. (2000) Small perturbations and stochastic games, Israel Journal of Mathematics 119, 127–142.
Vrieze, O.J. and Thuijsman, F. (1989) On equilibria in repeated games with absorbing states, International Journal of Game Theory 18, 293–310.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2003 Springer Science+Business Media New York
About this paper
Cite this paper
Solan, E. (2003). Perturbations of Markov Chains with Applications to Stochastic Games. In: Neyman, A., Sorin, S. (eds) Stochastic Games and Applications. NATO Science Series, vol 570. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0189-2_17
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0189-2_17
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-1-4020-1493-2
Online ISBN: 978-94-010-0189-2
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive