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Stochastic Games: Existence of the Minmax

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Part of the book series: NATO Science Series ((ASIC,volume 570))

Abstract

The existence of the value for stochastic games with finitely many states and actions, as well as for a class of stochastic games with infinitely many states and actions, is proved in [2]. Here we use essentially the same tools to derive the existence of the minmax and maxmin for n-player stochastic games with finitely many states and actions, as well as for a corresponding class of n-person stochastic games with infinitely many states and actions.

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References

  1. Coulomb, J.M. (2002) Stochastic games without perfect monitoring, mimeo

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  2. Mertens, J.-F. and Neyman, A. (1981) Stochastic gamesInternational Journal of Game Theory10, 53–66.

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  3. Neyman, A. (2003) Real algebraic tools in stochastic games, in A. Neyman and S. Sorin (eds.)Stochastic Games and ApplicationsNATO Science Series C, Mathematical and Physical Sciences, Vol. 570, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, Chapter 6, pp. 57–75.

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  4. Rosenberg, D., Solan, E. and Vieille, N. (2001) On the maxmin value of stochastic games with imperfect monitoring, Discussion Paper 1337, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University.

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  5. Rosenberg, D., Solan, E. and Vieille, N. (2002) Stochastic games with a single controller and incomplete information, Discussion Paper 1341, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University.

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  6. Solan, E. and Vieille, N. (2002) Correlated equilibrium in stochastic gamesGames and Economic Behavior38, 362–399.

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© 2003 Springer Science+Business Media New York

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Neyman, A. (2003). Stochastic Games: Existence of the Minmax. In: Neyman, A., Sorin, S. (eds) Stochastic Games and Applications. NATO Science Series, vol 570. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0189-2_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0189-2_11

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4020-1493-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-010-0189-2

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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