Abstract
In this chapter, a theoretical framework for the analysis of Swedish environmental support to the Baltic States is presented. First, it will be shown that transnational cooperation has been perceived as necessary by the riparian states’ governments in order to rehabilitate the environmental status of the Baltic Sea. This perception seems to imply that collective goods exist. Otherwise, private incentives, in combination with established property rights would, strictly speaking, be sufficient, and other institutional mechanisms would be superfluous. The reasonability of the assumed existence of collective goods will be discussed and analyzed.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
The two most important bilateral donors of environmental aid to the Baltic States apart from Sweden have been Denmark and Finland. A review of the Danish aid policy can be found in Ringius et al (1996). The Finnish experience is described and analyzed in Henttonen (1996) and Hiltunen (1996).
The two most important bilateral donors of environmental aid to the Baltic States apart from Sweden have been Denmark and Finland. A review of the Danish aid policy can be found in Ringius et al (1996). The Finnish experience is described and analyzed in Henttonen (1996) and Hiltunen (1996).
Some of the often-cited authors in the former category include Taylor (1976), Weingast (1984), and Snidal (1991), while Ostrom (1994) and Axelrod (1984) are examples in the latter category.
This assumed correlation should not be confused with the so-called Kuznets Curve. The Kuznets Curve depicts a relation between GNP and the state of the environment. It could very well occur that despite increasing GNP, the state of the environment would deteriorate even with increasing levels of investment in the environmental sector (i.e. if the declining opportunity cost for environmental investments does not compensate for increased pollution caused by higher economic activity). What is stated here, however, is only that there is a negative correlation between opportunity cost for environmental investments and GNP. Thus it does not state anything about the state of the environment. For a recent work on the Kuznets Curve, see for example Vogel (1999).
Observations of similar kinds have been made by several authors in the contexts of economics: “”The first-best can be achieved because … discontinuity … makes every player the marginal, decisive player: if he shirks a little, output falls drastically and with certainty.” (Rasmusen 1997:215) A number of applications in different contexts but all facing similar problems are cited in Rasmusen (1997: Chapter 8).
There are several other conceivable mechanisms designed to curb free riding that have been analyzed in relation to international, environmental cooperation. By attaching issues in other areas, cooperation can be enhanced by so-called issue linkage (Whalley 1991), in matching approaches one country takes the first step and thereby induces others to behave more cooperatively (Barrett 1995), social norms have by some authors been found to enhance cooperation (Hoel & Schneider 1997), tit-for-tat and trigger strategies are game theoretic strategies that generally increase cooperation (Cesar 1994 and Barrett 1995, respectively). Most of these mechanisms, however, are only applicable if an iterated games approach is used.
Environmental attitudes in the Baltic region have been studied by, for example, Gooch (1995) and Szrubka (forthcoming).
Although the so called Kuhn-Zermelo theorem stating that every finite n-person game of perfect and complete information has a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium in pure strategies, provided that no player is indifferent between any of his/her strategies, was formulated in 1913, it is only recently that this concept has been more widely used by political scientists (Zermelo 1913). The concept of sequential equilibria was developed by Kreps and Wilson in the early eighties, as a way to find solutions based on consistent beliefs and strategies (according to Bayes theorem) (Wilson 1982). With this concept, Nash equilibria that seem obviously unreasonable can be rejected by a coherent mechanism.
The Bayesian approach has also been criticized, but not so much on its general validity as on how exactly the updating of information should be formalized and interpreted. See for example Bacchus (1990), Nozick (1995), and Thomson (1996).
One of the earliest and most influential works on iterated games and the importance of creating a reputation were published by David Kreps et al in 1982. See Kreps (1982) and Wilson (1982). As noticed by, for example, Denrell (2000), the task to formulate a realistic iterated game sequence is often difficult. One problem is that the actors might not draw the same conclusions from past experiences (the history of the game). If they are assumed to do so, the validity of the analysis would most likely decrease.
This approach bears some resemblance to the methodology often called “modeling by example”. See for example Rasmusen (1997).
This general possibility to act strategically to maximize external support has been noticed by for example Gil & Folmer (1998).
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2003 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Hassler, B. (2003). Modeling Swedish Environmental Assistance. In: Science and Politics of Foreign Aid. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0123-6_2
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0123-6_2
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-3969-7
Online ISBN: 978-94-010-0123-6
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive