Abstract
The Turing Test (TT), as originally specified, centres on the ability to perform a social role. The TT can be seen as a test of an ability to enter into normal human social dynamics. In this light it seems unlikely that such an entity can be wholly designed in an “off-line” mode; rather a considerable period of training in situ would be required. The argument that since we can pass the TT, and our cognitive processes might be implemented as a Turing Machine (TM), that consequently a TM that could pass the TT could be built, is attacked on the grounds that not all TMs are constructible in a planned way. This observation points towards the importance of developmental processes that use random elements (e.g., evolution), but in these cases it becomes problematic to call the result artificial. This has implications for the means by which intelligent agents could be developed.
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Edmonds, B. (2003). The Constructibility of Artificial Intelligence (as Defined by the Turing Test). In: Moor, J.H. (eds) The Turing Test. Studies in Cognitive Systems, vol 30. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0105-2_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0105-2_7
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