Look Who’s Moving the Goal Posts Now

  • Larry Hauser
Part of the Studies in Cognitive Systems book series (COGS, volume 30)

Abstract

The abject failure of Turing’s first prediction (of computer success in playing the Imitation Game) confirms the aptness of the Imitation Game test as a test of human level intelligence. It especially belies fears that the test is too easy. At the same time, this failure disconfirms expectations that human level artificial intelligence will be forthcoming any time soon. On the other hand, the success of Turing’s second prediction (that acknowledgment of computer thought processes would become commonplace) in practice amply confirms the thought that computers think in some manner and are possessed of some level of intelligence already. This lends ever-growing support to the hypothesis that computers will think at a human level eventually, despite the abject failure of Turing’s first prediction.

Keywords

Alan 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Larry Hauser
    • 1
  1. 1.Alma CollegeDepartment of PhilosophyUSA

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