A Paradigm of Philosophy: The Adversary Method

  • Janice Moulton
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 161)


It is frequently thought that there are attributes, or kinds of behavior, that it is good for one sex to have and bad for the other sex to have. Aggression is a particularly interesting example of such an attribute. This paper investigates and criticizes a model of philosophic methodology that accepts a positive view of aggressive behavior and uses it as a paradigm of philosophic reasoning. But before I turn to this paradigm, I want to challenge the broader view of aggression that permits it positive connotations.


Moral Reasoning Scientific Reasoning Positive Concept Philosophic Reasoning Philosophical Belief 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Janice Moulton
    • 1
  1. 1.Smith CollegeUSA

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