Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 161)
How Can Language be Sexist?
Prima facie, our title question may seem pointless. Barring bigots, virtually everybody will agree that language is frequently used in a sexist way. Why, then, the question?
KeywordsWorld Line Evaluation Principle Feminist Philosophy Referential System Primitive Word
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