Abstract
In Chapter 2, it was argued that legitimacy of law is more easily maintained and reinforced in cases of perceived ingroup governance. We have seen that government fishery regulation has a significantly larger degree of legitimacy in Uerhavn than in Little Spruce Harbour. If we assume that this is a general difference between Norway and Newfoundland, we might start looking for differences on the macro level that might explain these observations.
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Several factors have weakened fishermen’s control of fish trade over the past ten years. Fish buyers do no longer need the specific approval of the sales organisations. It has become easier for foreign vessels to land catch in Norway, and the practice that the sales organisations have charged a fee on behalf of the Norwegian Fishermen’s Association has also been judged illegal, severely weakening the economy of the union (Apostle et al. 1998: 101–102).
This does not mean that the Norwegian Fishermen’s Association has always succeeded in influencing government decisions on important matters. As described by Sagdahl (1982a: 32–33; 1982b) and Mikalsen (1982a), the Norwegian Fishermen’s Association lost, fully or partly, important battles in the struggle to shape Norwegian fisheries policy. Among the important issues were expansion of the trawler fleet, to which the Fishermen’s Association was resistant, and the question of a trawler fleet exclusively owned by fishermen, which the association promoted but the authorities only partly complied with. These issues caused significant political tension. On the other hand, the fishermen and their organisation constituted a significant political force to which the government had to pay attention.
Based on data from the International Social Survey Programme, Hjerm (1998) has argued that this perceived innocence has little root in reality as nationalism is strongly correlated with xenophobia also in Norway.
“Responsible government” essentially meant that the British cabinet system was established in the colony, making the executive council a cabinet responsible to the elected assembly rather than to the governor (McNaught 1970: 91).
Graesser, cited by Hiller (1987).
Newfoundland’s mean score was 6.06. The categories were organised as follows: Low = 0–6, Middle = 7–9, High = 10–12 (Elkins 1980: 9–10).
Unpublished manuscript by Perlin & Rawlyk cited by Rawlyk (1979) and Hiller (1987: 265).
On the other hand, Newfoundlanders did not have a particularly low score on the “satisfaction with federal government” variable. In a 1978 survey, 90% of Newfoundlanders answered that confederation had been a good thing for Newfoundland (Gibbins 1994: 167). I believe that the Newfoundland history of distrust of provincial politicians, addressed in the next section, may explain this apparent ambivalence regarding the federal government.
In 1988, a few Norwegian inshore fishermen formed the Coastal Fishermen’s Association, which has not gained political influence yet. Crew members on factory ships and part of the trawler fleet are organised in The Norwegian Seamen’s Union (Norsk Sjømannforbund) (Hallenstvedt 1995; Sagdahl 1992). In Newfoundland, there have been a few local co-operatives.
The sales organisations are historically closely linked to the Norwegian Fishermen’s Association, but these ties have in recent years been weakened by changes to the Raw Fish Act (Holm 1996).
Information received from the Norwegian Fishermen’s Association; Hallenstvedt & Dynna 1976: 492–498; Lauritzen 1996; Norsk Fiskerinæring nr.4/1995.
The above applies to stocks managed by Canada. Apart from 2J3KL cod, stocks straddling the 200 miles limit are assessed by the NAFO Scientific Council, in which CAFSAC used to participate (Steele et al. 1992: 60). The FFAW/CAW participates in the group of advisors for the Canadian NAFO representative (NAFO 2000: 119, 225).
However, large fishing and processing companies recruited personnel strategically in order to enhance lobbying capacity in the late 1970s. In Newfoundland, the FFAW/CAW no doubt constituted an important counterweight to the power of the large companies (Barret 1984; Parsons 1993: 365; Pross & McCorquodale 1990: 46–47).
This role was stated in 1962 in a letter from the Ministry of Fisheries regarding negotiations between the government and industry on government economic assistance (Hallenstvedt & Dynna 1976: 361).
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© 2003 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Gezelius, S.S. (2003). Accounting for Differences of Legitimacy. In: Regulation and Compliance in the Atlantic Fisheries. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0051-2_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0051-2_6
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