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Terrorism pp 19–46Cite as

Confronting Political Authority Non-Violently

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Part of the book series: Philosophical Studies Series ((PSSP,volume 101))

Abstract

If the previous line of argument is plausible, then it follows that some form of legal disobedience is morally justified. But since there are a variety of such ways to disobey the law, then it is important to examine philosophically some of them in order to better understand which ones, if any, are morally justified. Let us consider each of the following forms of legal disobedience: pacifism, civil disobedience, non-violent direct action, and in subsequent chapters, political violence in general, including secession and terrorism.

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Notes

  1. Jan Narveson, “Pacifism: A Philosophical Analysis” in Joe P. White, Editor, Assent/Dissent (Dubuque: Kendall/Hunt, 1984), p. 77.

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  2. M. Jay Whitman, “Is Pacifism Self Contradictory?” Ethics, 75 (1965), p. 307.

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  3. Whitman, “Is Pacifism Self-Contradictory?” p. 307.

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  4. Whitman, “Is Pacifism Self-Contradictory?” p. 307.

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  5. Whitman, “Is Pacifism Self-Contradictory?” p. 308.

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  6. Tom Regan, “A Defense of Pacifism,” in Joe P. White, Editor, Assent/Dissent (Dubuque: Kendall/Hunt, 1984), p. 99.

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  7. Regan, “A Defense of Pacifism,” p. 102.

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  8. Regan, “A Defense of Pacifism,” p. 102.

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  9. Regan, “A Defense of Pacifism,” p. 103.

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  10. For a philosophical analysis of Martin Luther King, Jr’s concept and practice of Non-Violent Direct Action, see J. Angelo Corlett, “Political Integration, Political Separation, and the African-American Experience: Martin Luther King, Jr. and Malcolm X on Social Change,” Humbodlt Journal of Social Relations, 21 (1995), pp. 191–208, and below in the discussion of civil disobedience.

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  11. Regan, “A Defense of Pacifism,” p. 104.

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  12. Martin Luther King, Jr., “Letter from Birmingham Jail,” in Paul Harris, Editor, Civil Disobedience (Lanham: University Press of America, 1989), pp. 59–60.

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  13. Hugo Adam Bedau, “Review of Carl Cohen, Civil Disobedience: Conscience, Tactics, and the Law,” The Journal of Philosophy, 69 (1972), p. 181.

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  14. For discussions of the concept of political authority in Plato’s Crito, see R. E. Allen, “Law and Justice in Plato’s Crito,” The Journal of Philosophy, 69 (1972), pp. 557–67; Eva Brann, “The Offense of Socrates: A Re-reading of Plato’s Apology,” Interpretation, 7 (1978), pp. 1–21; Ann Congleton, “Two Kinds of Lawlessness,” Political Theory, 2 (1974), pp. 432–46; R. D. Dixit, “Socrates on Civil Disobedience,” Indian Philosophical Quarterly, 8 (1980), pp. 91–8; J. Peter Euben, “Philosophy and Politics in Plato’s Crito,” Political Theory, 6 (1978), pp. 149–72; Gene G. James, “Socrates on Civil Disobedience and Rebellion,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 11 (1973), pp. 119–27; Robert J. McLaughlin, “Socrates on Political Disobedience,” Phronesis, 21 (1976), pp. 185–97; Rex Martin, “Socrates on Disobedience to the Law,” The Review of Metaphysics, 24 (1970), pp. 21–38; Harry Prosch, “Toward an Ethics of Civil Disobedience,” Ethics, 77 (1967), pp. 181f; Gregory Vlastos, “Socrates on Political Obedience and Disobedience,” Yale Review (1974), pp. 517–34; Francis C. Wade, “In Defense of Socrates,” The Review of Metaphysics, 25 (1971), pp. 311–25; A. D. Woozley, “Socrates on Disobeying the Law” in Gregory Vlastos, Editor, The Philosophy of Socrates (New York: Anchor-Doubleday, 1971), pp. 299–318; Gary Young, “Socrates and Obedience,” Phronesis, 19 (1974), pp. 1–29.

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  15. See Stuart M. Brown, Jr., “Civil Disobedience,” The Journal of Philosophy, LVIII, (1961), pp. 669–81; Joel Feinberg, “Civil Disobedience in the Modern World,” Humanities in Society, 2 (1979), pp. 37–60; Michael Walzer, “The Obligation to Disobey,” Ethics, 77 (1967), pp. 163–75; Richard Wasserstrom, “The Obligation to Obey the Law,” in Joe P. White, Editor, Assent/Dissent (Dubuque: Kendall/Hunt, 1984), pp. 29–44.

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  16. It has been pointed out, however, that neither absolute legalists nor absolute individualistic moralists construe civil disobedience as a real problem. See Alan Gewirth, “Civil Disobedience, Law, and Morality: An Examination of Justice Fortas’ Doctrine,” The Monist, 54 (1970), pp. 536f.

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  17. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 363–91; see also, John Rawls, “The Justification of Civil Disobedience,” in Joe P. White (Editor), Assent/Dissent (Dubuque: Kendall/Hunt, 1984), pp. 225–36; John Rawls, “Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play,” in Joe P. White (Editor), Assent/Dissent (Dubuque: Kendall/Hunt, 1984), pp. 45–56.

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  18. Views on the nature and justification of civil disobedience range from Immanuel Kant’s denial that there is any legitimate place for it in a social order to Paul Harris’ view that certain violent actions can be species of civil disobedience, thereby blurring the distinction between, say, terrorism and civil disobedience. As we saw, Kant writes, “It is the people’s duty to endure even the most intolerable abuse of supreme authority” [See Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice John Ladd, Translator (London: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1965), p. 86]. For a discussion of Kant’s view of civil disobedience, see Roger Hancock, “Kant and Civil Disobedience,” Idealistic Studies, 5 (1975), pp. 164–76. Harris states that “I agree with these arguments as reasons for excluding nonviolence from the definition of civil disobedience” [See Paul Harris, Editor, Civil Disobedience (Lanham: University Press of America, 1989), p. 12]. Of course, Berel Lang argues “that acts which meet the criteria of civil disobedience need not be nonviolent” [Berel Lang, “Civil Disobedience and Nonviolence: A Distinction With a Difference,” Ethics, 80 (1970), p. 156].

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  19. M. K. Gandhi, Non-Violent Resistance, Bharatan Kumarappa, Editor (New York: Schocken Books, 1961).

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  20. For a discussion of both of these views of civil disobedience, see Vinit Haksar, Civil Disobedience, Threats and Offers: Gandhi and Rawls (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1986); “Coercive Proposals (Rawls and Gandhi),” Political Theory, 4 (1976), pp. 65–79; “Rawls and Gandhi on Civil Disobedience,” Inquiry, 19 (1976), pp. 151–92.

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  21. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 364; “The Justification of Civil Disobedience,” p. 229; H. A. Bedau, “On Civil Disobedience,” The Journal of Philosophy, 58 (1961), pp. 653f

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  22. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 366; “The Justification of Civil Disobedience,” p. 230. See also Feinberg, “Civil Disobedience in the Modern World.” Hannah Arendt argues that civil disobedience is essentially a species of collective action [Hannah Arendt, Civil Disobedience (New York: Penguin Books, 1973). For a critical discussion of Arendt’s position, see Kella Sarala, “Hannah Arendt on Civil Disobedience,” Indian Philosophical Quarterly, 13 (1986), pp. 261–9], Rawls’ analysis of civil disobedience does not limit the agents of civil disobedience to groups. Nor does Hugo Adam Bedau, “Civil Disobedience and Personal Responsibility for Injustice,” The Monist, 54 (1970), pp. 517–35.

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  23. Rawls, “The Justification of Civil Disobedience,” p. 230. As A. D. Woozley argues, “The civil disobedient claiming a principled right to break the law cannot deny the law enforcer the right to keep it” [See A. D. Woozley, “Civil Disobedience and Punishment,” Ethics, 86 (1976), p. 331]. However, as Marshall Cohen states, “it does not follow from the fact that the disobedient is willing to pay the penalty that the government ought to exact it” [See Marshall Cohen, “Liberalism and Disobedience,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1 (1972), p. 288].

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  24. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 366, emphasis provided. For a definition of “civil disobedience” which is akin to Rawls’ except for the notion of civil disobedience not being a threat, see W. T. Blackstone, “The Definition of Civil Disobedience,” Journal of Social Philosophy, 2 (1971), pp. 3–5.

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  25. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 366; “The Justification of Civil Disobedience,” p. 230. For a discussion of violent and non-violent actions, see R. K. Gupta, “Defining Violent and Non-Violent Acts,” Journal of the Indian Council for Philosophical Research, 9 (1992), pp. 157–62; “Defining Violent and Non-Violent Acts: A Supplement,” Journal of the Indian Council for Philosophical Research, 10 (1993), pp. 109–11.

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  26. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 365.

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  27. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 376.

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  28. Wesley Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1919).

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  29. Joel Feinberg, “The Nature and Value of Rights,” The Journal of Value Inquiry, 4 (1970), pp. 243–57. Also, see Joel Feinberg, Freedom and Fulfillment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), Chapters 8–10; Rights, Justice, and the Bounds of Liberty (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980).

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  30. Harris, Civil Disobedience, p. 7.

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  31. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 364.

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  32. Harris, Civil Disobedience, p. 7.

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  33. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 366.

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  34. Harris, Civil Disobedience, p. 11.

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  35. Harris, Civil Disobedience, p. 11.

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  36. Harris, Civil Disobedience pp. 11–2.

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  37. Michael Bayles, “The Justifiability of Civil Disobedience,” The Review of Metaphysics, 24 (1970), p. 5.

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  38. Noam Chomsky, For Reasons of State (New York: Pantheon Books, 1973), p. 295.

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  39. For a discussion of varieties of civil disobedience, see Rex Martin, “Civil Disobedience,” Ethics, 80 (1970), pp. 123–39.

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  40. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 363.

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  41. This section is a condensed version of part of what is pointed out in Corlett, “Political Integration, Political Separation, and the African-American Experience: Martin Luther King, Jr. and Malcolm X on Social Change,” pp. 191–207.

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  42. This distinction is especially helpful given that some philosophers have conflated these rather different modes of political and social change (See) Martin, “Civil Disobedience,” p. 124.

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  43. Martin Luther King, Jr., “Next Stop: The North,” in James M. Washington, Editor, A Testament of Hope: The Essential Writings of Martin Luther King, Jr. (New York: Harper and Row, 1986), p. 193.

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  44. King, “The Rising Tide of Racial Consciousness,” in Washington, A Testament of Hope, p. 149.

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  45. King, “An Address Before the National Press Club,” in Washington, A Testament of Hope, p. 102.

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  46. King, “Nonviolence and Racial Justice, in Washington, A Testament of Hope, p. 7; “The Current Crisis in Race Relations,” in Washington, A Testament of Hope, p. 86; “An Experiment in Love,” in Washington, A Testament of Hope, p. 17.

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  47. King, “Nonviolence and Racial Justice,” p. 7; “The Current Crisis in Race Relations,” p. 87; “The Most Durable Power,” in A Testament of Hope, p. 10; “The Power of Nonviolence,” in Washington, A Testament of Hope, p. 12; “An Experiment in Love,” pp. 17–18.

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  48. King, “Nonviolence and Racial Justice,” p. 8; “The Current Crisis in Race Relations,” p. 87; “An Experiment in Love,” p. 18. This feature of non-violent direct action is urged as a defining condition of civil disobedience in Prosch, “Towards an Ethics of Civil Disobedience,” pp. 176f

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  49. King, “Nonviolence and Racial Justice,” p. 8; “The Current Crisis in Race Relations,” p. 87; “An Experiment in Love,” p. 18.

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  50. King, “Nonviolence and Racial Justice,” p. 9; “The Current Crisis in Race Relations,” p. 88; “An Experiment in Love,” p. 20.

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  51. King, “An Experiment in Love,” p. 18.

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  52. For alternative discussions of the justificatory status of civil disobedience, see Bayles, “The Justifiability of Civil Disobedience,” pp. 3–20; W. T. Blackstone, “Civil Disobedience: Is it Justified?” The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 8 (1970), pp. 233–50; Carl Cohen, “Defending Civil Disobedience,” The Monist, 54 (1970), pp. 469–87; Leslie MacFarlane, “Justifying Political Disobedience,” Ethics, 75 (1965), pp. 103–11; “More About Civil Disobedience,” Ethics, 77 (1967), pp. 311–13.

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  53. Rawls’ wording seems to reflect the following caution concerning our thinking about civil disobedience and its moral justification: Any principle that could do the job required, being a principle of conduct, would itself be open to the very kind of demurrers and controversy it was designed to settle. Second, there is no compelling reason for anyone to adopt any principle in advance of knowing exactly what it will require of him. Since the kind of principle at issue here is likely to be formulated in the chronically open-textured moral concepts of justice, rights,… one cannot know [Hugo Adam Bedau, “On Civil Disobedience,” The Journal of Philosophy, 58 (1961), pp. 663–64].

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  54. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 372; “The Justification of Civil Disobedience,” pp. 231–32. This condition is denied as a defining condition of civil disobedience in Bedau, “On Civil Disobedience,” p. 660.

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  55. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 373; “The Justification of Civil Disobedience,” p. 231.

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  56. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 373.

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  57. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 373; “The Justification of Civil Disobedience,” p. 232.

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  58. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 374.

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  59. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 374.

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  60. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 374.

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  61. Rawls, “The Justification of Civil Disobedience,” p. 234. In A Theory of Justice, these words are supported by the following claim: “Thus the right to civil disobedience should, like any other right, be rationally framed to advance one’s ends or the ends one wishes to assist” (p. 376). However, in A Theory of Justice Rawls does not make this a further condition of justified civil disobedience.

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  62. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 383. As Fred R. Burger writes, “Civil disobedience may contribute to greater order and a more stable legal system by helping to remove … causes of disorder” [Fred R. Burger, ‘“Law and Order’ and Civil Disobedience,” Inquiry, 13 (1970), p. 254].

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  63. For statements of such principles, see Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 60: Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 5–6.

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  64. For an excellent analysis of coercion and threats, see Joel Feinberg, Harm to Self (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 191f

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  65. Feinberg, Harm to Self, p. 216.

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  66. Feinberg, Harm to Self, p. 216.

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  70. Indeed, Martin Luther King, Jr. notes that: Nonviolent direct action seeks to create such a crisis and establish such creative tension that a community that has constantly refused to negotiate is forced to confront the issue. … there is a type of constructive nonviolent tension that is necessary for growth…. So the purpose of the direct action is to create a situation so crisis-packed that it will inevitably open the door to negotiation…. we have not made a single gain in civil rights without determined legal and nonviolent pressure. History is the long and tragic story of the fact that privileged groups seldom give up their privileges voluntarily…. freedom is never voluntarily given by the oppressor; it must be demanded by the oppressed. [See Martin Luther King, Jr., “Letter From Birmingham Jail,” in Joe P. White, Editor, Assent/Dissent (Dubuque: Kendall/Hunt, 1984), pp. 167–168. My emphasis]. It is obvious that the paradigm cases of civil disobedience involve a certain amount or type of force which either implies or directs a threat. In fact, the civil rights movement succeeded in delimiting racial segregation largely because the European American business class became convinced that further turmoil and publicity would spell trouble for their businesses, not because they suddenly became convinced of the righteousness of the demands of the oppressed.

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  71. This claim is consistent with Paul Harris’ observation that civil disobedience to the Fugitive Slave Laws was an important part of the abolitionist movement [See Harris, Civil Disobedience, p. 1]. For more on the enforcement and interpretation of the Fugitive Slave Laws by the judiciary, see Robert M. Cover, Justice Accused (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975); Ronald Dworkin, “Review of Robert M. Cover, Justice Accused,” Times Literary Supplement, 5 December 1975.

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  72. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 367.

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  73. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 366. Emphasis provided.

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  74. Harris, Civil Disobedience, p. 27.

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  75. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 364.

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  76. Harris, Civil Disobedience, p. 4.

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  77. Harris, Civil Disobedience, p. 12.

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  1. San Diego State University, San Diego, USA

    J. Angelo Corlett

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Corlett, J.A. (2003). Confronting Political Authority Non-Violently. In: Terrorism. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 101. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0039-0_3

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