Abstract
As the point of departure for our new meditations, let us take what may seem to be a grave objection. The objection concerns nothing less than the claim of transcendental phenomenology to be itself transcendental philosophy and therefore its claim that, in the form of a constitutional problematic and theory moving within the limits of the transcendentally reduced ego, it can solve the transcendental problems pertaining to the Objective world. When I, the meditating I, reduce myself to my absolute transcendental ego by phenomenological epoché do I not become solus ipse; and do I not remain that, as long as I carry on a consistent self-explication under the name phenomenology? Should not a phenomenology that proposed to solve the problems of Objective being, and to present itself actually as philosophy, be branded therefore as transcendental solipsism?
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1999 Kluwer Academic Publishers
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Husserl, E. (1999). Uncovering of the Sphere of Transcendental Being as Monadological Intersubjectivity. In: Cartesian Meditations. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9997-8_6
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9997-8_6
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-247-0068-4
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-9997-8
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive