• Roberto Torretti
Part of the Episteme book series (EPIS, volume 7)


Modern philosophy of geometry is closely associated with non-Euclidean geometry and may almost be said to stem from it. The long history leading to the discovery of non-Euclidean geometry will be summarized in the first sections of Chapter 2. The present chapter touches upon other aspects of the historical background of our subject, which will be useful in our subsequent discussions. In the first three sections of this chapter, we shall deal with the Greek beginnings of geometry and philosophy, the uses of geometry in Greek and early modern natural science, and the metaphysics of space that was part and parcel of the accepted view of nature from the 17th to the 19th century. In the fourth and last section, we shall discuss the method of coordinates introduced by René Descartes for describing geometrical configurations and relations in space.


Directed Distance Heavenly Body Book Versus Planetary Model Directed Segment 
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Copyright information

© D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland 1984

Authors and Affiliations

  • Roberto Torretti
    • 1
  1. 1.University of Puerto RicoPuerto Rico

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