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Abbreviations
- B(i, d) :
-
Payoff to participation in revolt on side of existing government.
- Di :
-
Private reward to individual for participation in putting down revolt if government wins.
- Δpi:
-
Change in probability of revolutionary success resulting from individual participation in revolution.’
- Gi :
-
Public good generated by successful revolution.
- G(i, in) :
-
Total payoff to inaction.
- G(i, r) :
-
Total payoff to subject if he joins revolution.
- Ji :
-
Injury suffered in action.
- p:
-
Likelihood of revolutionary victory assuming subject is neutral.
- p′:
-
Likelihood of injury through participation in revolution (for or against).
- pi :
-
Private penalty imposed on individual for participation in revolution if revolt fails.
- Ri :
-
Private reward to individual for his participation in revolution if revolution wins.
- S(i, d) :
-
Private cost imposed on defenders of government if revolt succeeds.
- Ti :
-
Entertainment value of participation.
- V(i, r) :
-
Opportunity cost (benefit) to individual from participation rather than remaining neutral.
References
P. Samuelson, ‘The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure’,Review of Economics and Statistics 54 (Nov., 1954), 387–9; ‘A Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public Expenditure’,Loc. cit.55 (Nov., 1955), 387–389;cf.The Collected Scientific Papers of Paul Samuelson, R. Merton, ed., Vol III, Cambridge, Mass., 1972; A. C. Pigou,The Economics of Welfare, Macmillan, London, 1920.
P. Samuelson, ‘The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure’,Review of Economics and Statistics 54 (Nov., 1954), 387–9; ‘A Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public Expenditure’,Loc. cit.55 (Nov., 1955), 387–389;cf.The Collected Scientific Papers of Paul Samuelson, R. Merton, ed., Vol III, Cambridge, Mass., 1972; A. C. Pigou,The Economics of Welfare, Macmillan, London, 1920.
P. Samuelson, ‘The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure’,Review of Economics and Statistics 54 (Nov., 1954), 387–9; ‘A Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public Expenditure’,Loc. cit.55 (Nov., 1955), 387–389;cf.The Collected Scientific Papers of Paul Samuelson, R. Merton, ed., Vol III, Cambridge, Mass., 1972; A. C. Pigou,The Economics of Welfare, Macmillan, London, 1920.
Mancur Olson,The Logic of Collective Action, Harvard Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1965.
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© 1979 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Tullock, G. (1979). The Economics of Revolution. In: Johnson, H.J., Leach, J.J., Muehlmann, R.G. (eds) Revolutions, Systems and Theories. Theory and Decision Library, vol 19. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9894-0_5
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