Abstract
Ideally science should tell us many interesting things about the world, and what it says should be certain. It should tell us much both in the sense of being precise and in the sense of giving us deep knowledge, knowledge of the underlying structures, of the innermost constitution of the world. At least so it was thought for a long time, from the Pre-socratics to recent times. J. W. N. Watkins calls this ideal of science ‘the Bacon-Descartes Ideal’ in his contribution ‘The Popperian Approach to Scientific Knowledge’, which opens the LSE-position paper at the very beginning of this volume.
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Radnitzky, G., Andersson, G. (1978). Objective Criteria of Scientific Progress? Inductivism, Falsificationism, and Relativism. In: Radnitzky, G., Andersson, G. (eds) Progress and Rationality in Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 58. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9866-7_1
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