Sellars on Proper Names and Belief Contexts

Abstract

In this paper, I compare Sellars’ views on the interpretation of proper names with another current theory. According to the latter, such names rigidly designate the object they name.¹ Combined with the thesis that what is believed is a proposition and the thesis that substitution of one rigid designator for another designating the same object results in the expression of the same proposition, we obtain paradoxical results.² This paradox is avoided by the view Sellars defends according to which proper names in belief contexts refer to individual concepts and only indirectly to the objects designated by those concepts.³ Two proper names of the same person may designate different individual concepts that designate the same individual. When a name designates an individual concept, there are certain conceptual necessities implicit in the concept that restrict the set of possible worlds. This creates a problem if one attempts to combine the doctrine that names are rigid designators with the theory Sellars espouses. Another problem arises because we can clearly imagine worlds in which the conceptual necessities implicit in individual concepts are violated. I propose solutions to these and related problems below. Finally, Sellars explicates individual concepts in terms of linguistic rules, and thus the same proper name might designate different individual concepts in different idiolects. A completely adequate account presupposes, I suggest, a consensual theory of language rules.