Abstract
As a suitable introduction to our subject we shall consider two competing firms. We shall assume that their situation can be represented by the game known as the ‘Prisoners’ Dilemma’, and that it can be described by the following double matrix
The elements of the matrix can be interpreted as the profits of the two firms. The only equilibrium point in this game is the pair (−1, −1).
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© 1978 D.Reidel Publishing Company, Dordercht, Holland
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Borch, K. (1978). Ethics, Institutions and Optimality. In: Gottinger, H.W., Leinfellner, W. (eds) Decision Theory and Social Ethics. Theory and Decision Library, vol 17. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9838-4_13
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9838-4_13
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-277-0937-0
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