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Genetic and Descriptive Psychology

  • Theodore De Boer
Part of the Phaenomenologica book series (PHAE, volume 76)

Abstract

In the preceding chapter, I have tried to convey an impression of the new kind of analysis of consciousness that Husserl brings into play in LU. This descriptive psychology has a definite function in LU: it is intended to clarify the fundamental concepts of pure logic and thereby serve as a philosophical complement to this logic. The specific task of descriptive psychology with regard to logic will be discussed in Chapter 4 and 5.

Keywords

Empirical Science Normative Science Explanatory Psychology Physical Thing Pure Logic 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Martinus Nijhoff Publishers bv, The Hague 1978

Authors and Affiliations

  • Theodore De Boer

There are no affiliations available

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