Acts, Contents, and the Relations between Them

  • Theodore De Boer
Part of the Phaenomenologica book series (PHAE, volume 76)

Abstract

In this first chapter the theme of intentionality in the early Husserl will be discussed. As Husserl himself pointed out later in Ideen I, “The name of the problem that encompasses all of phenomenology is intentionality.”1 Because of the central place which intentionality already occupied in the thought of the early Husserl, and because of the universal significance which it was later to assume, an analysis of this theme is an excellent way to get into the genesis of phenomenology. I will discuss in turn the intentional relation of consciousness to its objects, the mode of being of intentional objects, and the relation between these objects and acts of consciousness.

Keywords

Manifold Germinal Coherence Posit Stein 

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Copyright information

© Martinus Nijhoff Publishers bv, The Hague 1978

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  • Theodore De Boer

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