A Game Theoretic Account of Social Justice

  • Horace W. Brock


The role in ethics of game theory proper (as opposed to decision theory) is discussed via an elucidation of a new theory of justice. The new theory integrates into a coherent whole two fundamental distributive norms: To Each According to his Needs; and to Each According to his Contribution. The theory incorporates a new account of ethics in terms of impartial decision — an account which dispenses with the need for a Veil of Ignorance construct. Also, the new theory does not require the use of interpersonal comparisons of utility at an operational level, even though such comparisons arise at a conceptual level. The reason for this lies in its relationship to game theoretical structures which do not entail interpersonal comparisons. Finally, the theory makes possible a new interpretation of two cooperative game solutions: The Nash solution, and the Generalized Shapley Value.


Social Justice Decision Problem Social Choice Distributive Justice Ethical Theory 
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Copyright information

© D. Reidel Publishing Co., Dordrecht, Holland, and Boston, U.S.A. 1979

Authors and Affiliations

  • Horace W. Brock

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