Abstract
What follows introduces and explains a concept of epistemic presupposition with the following features.
-
I.
It helps elucidate some obscure concepts essential to recent theories of knowledge and justification.
-
II.
It facilitates a solution to the Gettier problem.
-
III.
It enables a disposition of several other vexing puzzles concerning knowledge and justification.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Gilbert Harman, Thought ( Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973 ).
Alvin Goldman, ‘Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge,’ The Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976) 771–791.
Ernest Sosa, ‘How Do You Know?’ The American Philosophical Quarterly 11 (1974) 113–122.
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1979 D. Riedel Publishing Company
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Sosa, E. (1979). Epistemic Presupposition. In: Pappas, G.S. (eds) Justification and Knowledge. Philosophical Studies Series in Philosophy, vol 17. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9493-5_5
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9493-5_5
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-277-1024-6
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-9493-5
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive