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Part of the book series: Philosophical Studies Series in Philosophy ((PSSP,volume 17))

Abstract

Much of what a person knows at any time is based on evidence the person has, or perhaps has had. More generally, most of a person’s knowledge at any time is based on reasons that the person has or has had. But what is it for knowledge to be based on evidence or reasons? A complete answer to this question requires a full theory of inferential knowledge, something I will not try to provide here. Instead, I will examine three notions of basing, each of which, under some interpretation, seems necessary for knowing on the basis of evidence or reasons.

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References

  • M. Swain, ‘Epistemic Defeasibility,’ American Philosophical Quarterly, 11, (1974)

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  • G. Pappas & M. Swain, eds., Essays on Knowledge and Justification, ( Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978 )

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  • K. Lehrer, ‘Knowledge, Truth and Evidence,’ in M. Roth & L. Galis, eds., Knowing, ( New York: Random House ), 1970, p. 56

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  • Swain, ‘Reasons, Causes and Knowledge,’ op. cit., pp. 229–230. Compare G. Harman, Thought, (Princeton: Princeton University Press ), 1973, Chapter 2

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  • Lehrer, ‘Knowledge, Truth and Evidence’ in Roth & Galis, op. cit., p. 56. Compare Lehrer, Knowledge, ( London: Oxford University Press ) 1974, pp. 156–157

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  • Elsewhere, Lehrer notes this point; see Knowledge, pp. 156–157

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  • J. Swanson & L. Foster, eds., Experience and Theory, (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press), 1970

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  • See J. Pollock, ‘The Structure of Epistemic Justification,’ American Philosophical Quarterly, Monograph Series, # 4, (1970), pp. 64–66. Compare Pollock’s account of implicit reasons in Knowledge and Justification, ( Princeton: Princeton University Press ), 1974

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© 1979 D. Riedel Publishing Company

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Pappas, G.S. (1979). Basing Relations. In: Pappas, G.S. (eds) Justification and Knowledge. Philosophical Studies Series in Philosophy, vol 17. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9493-5_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9493-5_3

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-277-1024-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-9493-5

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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