Abstract
Nominalism in one form or another is an age-old metaphysical view. Periodically it fluorishes, is properly buried by its critics, and lo! is resurrected only to gain greater force and cogency. Like most of the perennial metaphysical views, it dies hard, and with sufficiently refined formulation and updating it can be made well nigh invulnerable. The view is not an easy or obvious one, however, but difficult and abstruse and hence, to paraphrase Hume, has little appeal for the majority of philosophers. It has never been a popular view, especially in periods where philosophers tend to think more or less alike along some one “main line” of development.
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Notes
Cf., for example, B. van Fraassen, ‘Platonism’s Pyrrhic Victory.’
Problems and Projects, p. 160.
Cf. of course *90 and *91 of Principia Mathematica.
Cf. D. Hilbert and P. Bernays, Grundlagen der Mathematik (Springer, Berlin: 1939), Vol. II, Supplement IV.
‘Common Natures and Mathematical Scotism,’ in Peirce’s Logic of Relations and Other Papers. Cf. also some of the material in Chapter VIII above.
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© 1979 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Martin, R.M. (1979). Mathematical Nominalism. In: Pragmatics, Truth, and Language. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 38. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9457-7_20
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9457-7_20
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