Abstract
Tarski’s relation of satisfaction1 has been mentioned or discussed a good deal recently, but not often, it seems, with full understanding. Many misconceptions concerning it abound throughout the literature. The relation, it will be recalled, is one holding between an infinite sequence of objects (of some object language) and a sentential function (of that language) containing an arbitrary number (perhaps even none at all) of free variables. A sentence is then any sentential function containing no free variables, and a true sentence is, by definition, one satisfied by all infinite sequences, a false sentence being satisfied by none.
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Notes
See especially A. Tarski, ‘The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages,’ in his Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics, edited by J.H. Woodger (The Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1956).
See Karl R. Popper, Objective Knowledge (The Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1972), pp. 335–340.
See especially the author’s Truth and Denotation (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago: 1958, and reprinted without correction in 1975).
B. van Fraassen, ‘Platonism’s Pyrrhic Victory,’ in The Logical Enterprise, The Fitch Festschrift, edited by A. Anderson, Ruth Marcus, and R.M. Martin (Yale University Press, New Haven: 1975).
B. van Fraassen, ‘Platonism’s Pyrrhic Victory,’ in The Logical Enterprise, The Fitch Festschrift, edited by A. Anderson, Ruth Marcus, and R.M. Martin (Yale University Press, New Haven: 1975).
In addition to items in the standard constructivist and intuitionist literature, see the author’s ‘The Pragmatics of Counting’ in Events, Reference, and Logical Form.
H. Hiż, ‘Aletheic Semantic Theory,’ The Philosophical Forum 1 (1969): 438–451, p. 438.
Truth and Denotation, p. 216.
Ibid., p. 106. See also Belief, Existence, and Meaning, p. 140.
Cf. especially the recent statement in Z. Harris, ‘The Two Systems of Grammar: Report and Paraphrase,’ Papers in Structural and Transformational Linguistics (Reidel, Dordrecht: 1972). See also ‘On Harris’s Systems of Report and Paraphrase’ in Semiotics and Linguistic Structure.
The Journal of Symbolic Logic 24 (1960): 217–219.
See R. Carnap, Introduction to Semantics, pp. 45 ff.
Hartry Field, ‘Tarski’s Theory of Truth,’ The Journal of Philosophy 69 (1972): 347–375.
Wilfrid Sellars, Science and Metaphysics, the John Locke Lectures for 1965–66, typescript p. 93.
Wilfrid Sellars, ‘Truth and Correspondence,’ in Science, Perception, and Reality (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London: 1963), p. 199.
As in Events, Reference, and Logical Form, etc.
See especially Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, edited by P. Geach and M. Black (Blackwell,’s, Oxford: 1952), p. 11 and p. 57.
See also Chapters III above and XVI below. Cf. also N. Goodman’s notion of secondary extensions, in Problems and Projects (Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis: 1972), pp. 221 ff.
§§69 and 62, Cf. also the Introduction, p. 10.
Especially in Semiotics and Linguistic Structure.
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© 1979 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Martin, R.M. (1979). Some Reminders Concerning Truth, Satisfaction, and Reference. In: Pragmatics, Truth, and Language. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 38. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9457-7_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9457-7_2
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