Abstract
Pilate asked “What is truth,” but to stay the answer has turned out for philosophical logicians to be a long, arduous job. Dearly won progress has been made and should not be tossed aside lightly. A principle of conservation is always at work in the advance of science: hold on to the best we have, it is not easy to come by, extend it here and there as needed. The work of Tarski of 1933, stemming from that of Lesniewski, Kotarbinski, and others, is surely a major step forward in the analysis of the concept or notion of truth, and it has been improved and simplified in various ways during the intervening years. In one form or another the work has become classical and will very likely remain so for some time to come.
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Notes
Saul Kripke, ‘Outline of a Theory of Truth,’ The Journal of Philosophy 72 (1975): 690–716.
See especially ‘On the Very Idea of a Logical Form,’ and G. Harman, op. cit.
See Z. Harris, loc. cit., pp. 608–609.
One of the historically first attempts is the doctoral dissertation of E. Bustamente, Princeton, c. 1948. Cf. also Frank G. Bruner, Mathematical Logic with Transfinite Types (Privately printed, Chicago: 1943)
and of course P.B. Andrews, A Transfinite Type Theory with Type Variables (Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathema tics, North-Holland Publishing Co., Amsterdam: 1965).
Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics, pp. 271–272.
See especially Truth and Denotation, Chapters IV and V.
See Events, Reference, and Logical Form, ‘On Some Prepositional Relations,’ ‘On Harris’s Systems of Report and Paraphrase,’ and ‘On How Some Adverbs Work,’ Proceedings of the XVth World Congress of Philosophy, 1973 (Sofia, 1974), Vol. 3, pp. 379–382.
Cf. N. Goodman and W.V. Quine, ‘Steps toward a Constructive Nominalism,’ The Journal of Symbolic Logic 12 (1947): 105–122, and Truth and Denotation.
See Belief, Existence, and Meaning, Chapter II.
As well emphasized by Whitehead.
Recall Chapter XII above and cf. also ‘On Common Names and Mathematical Scotism,’ in Peirce’s Logic of Relations and Other Studies.
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© 1979 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Martin, R.M. (1979). The Truth about Kripke’s “Truth”. In: Pragmatics, Truth, and Language. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 38. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9457-7_13
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