Abstract
Right in the opening section of his paper on ‘Transcendental Proofs in the Critique of Pure Reason’1 Baum displays discontent with those interpreters who suppose that instead of asking: How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?, Kant is really asking: What are the necessary conditions of a possible experience?2 Baum is of the opinion that strategies which reduce Kant’s question to that form cannot give a satisfying account of the sort of theory the Critique of Pure Reason has to offer.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
So T. E. Wilkerson, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, Oxford 1976, p. 13. Wilkerson falls in with Strawson’s substitution of Kant’s famous question for a version which defines Kant’s task as “the investigation of that limiting framework of ideas and principles the use and application of which are essential to empirical knowledge, and which are implicit in any coherent conception of experience which we can form.” (The Bounds of Sense, London 1966, p. 18.) For Strawson’s own reservations against the synthetic a priori, cf. ibid., p. 43f.
Stephan Körner, ‘The Impossibility of Transcendental Deductions’, Kant-Studies Today (ed. by L. W. Beck), La Salle, 111. 1969, pp. 230–244. For a more recent version of Körner’s criticism of Kantian transcendental deductions see his ‘Über ontologische Notwendigkeit und die Begründung ontologischer Prinzipien’ [‘On Ontological Necessity and the Justification of Ontological Principles’], Neue Hefte für Philosophie (ed. by R. Bubner, K. Cramer, and R. Wiehl), XIV, Zur Zukunft der Transzendentalphilosophie [The Future of Transcendental Philosophy], Göttingen 1978, p. Iff., especially § § 1–3. (The volume contains, among others, articles to the topic by Roderick Chisholm, Moltke S. Gram, and Richard Rorty.)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1979 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Cramer, K. (1979). A Note on Transcendental Propositions in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason . In: Bieri, P., Horstmann, RP., Krüger, L. (eds) Transcendental Arguments and Science. Synthese Library, vol 133. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9410-2_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9410-2_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-277-0964-6
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-9410-2
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive