Transcendentalism and Protoscience
In what follows, I shall restrict myself to remarks with regard to two different, although related claims of Lorenz. I am not going to discuss all the allusions and implications of his paper. It is only the critical analysis of Kantian transcendentalism and the concept of a unified science I shall be concerned with. Equally, I am not interested right from the start to dispute the bipartite scheme of ‘ars judicandi’ and ‘ars inveniendi’ which serves as the background for everything Lorenz has to say in the paper. In the course of my argument, however, I shall have to question the legitimacy of this scheme which echoes the old subject-object-dualism all through the terminology of its exposition (person-oriented, matter-oriented e.g.). It will turn out — at least I hope it will — that such a dualistic scheme is inadequate for rendering or criticizing the Kantian position of transcendental philosophy. Furthermore it will become clear — or, again, I hope it will — that the claim of the ‘Konstruktive Wissen-schaftstheorie’ to be the successor to transcendentalism is ill-grounded. In treating this school, which German provincialism has labelled ‘Erlanger Schule’, I shall make use of the writings1 of Janich, Lorenzen and Mittelstrass besides the paper at hand.
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- 1.Cf. P. Lorenzen, ‘Wie ist die Objektivität der Physik möglich?’ [‘How is the Objectivity of Physics Possible?’J in Methodisches Denken [Methodological Thinking], Frankfurt 1969; P. Janich, in Zum normativen Fundament der Wissenschaft [On the Normative Foundation of Science] (ed. by F. Kambartel and J. Mittelstraß (eds.)), Frankfurt 1973.Google Scholar
- 2.Kant, Transcendental Arguments and the Problem of Deduction’, Rev. of Metaph. 28 (1975).Google Scholar
- 3.Cf. J. H. Lambert, Neues Organon, 1764, vol. II; Kant’s letters to Ijimhert from 2.9.1770 and to Herz from 21.2.1772.Google Scholar