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The Concept of Science. Some Remarks on the Methodological Issue ‘Construction’ Versus ‘Description’ in the Philosophy of Science

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Transcendental Arguments and Science

Part of the book series: Synthese Library ((SYLI,volume 133))

Abstract

Rationalism and empiricism, the kindred branches of modern western philosophy since its inception with Descartes and Hobbes, have made much of the distinction between mind and body. The corresponding schism between the act and the given, reminiscent of the Aristotelian categories ἄγ∈ω and πάσχ∈ω, has consequently to be looked at differently within the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of mind.

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Notes

  1. Cf. the collection of essays (by Chomsky, Goodman, Putnam) presented at the Symposium on Innate Ideas in Boston, Dec. 1966, published in Synthese 17 (1967); or the paragraph on Innate Ideas in the last chapter of J. J. Katz, The Philosophy of Language, New York-London 1966.

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  2. Cf. R. Reichenbach, Experience and Prediction, Chicago—London 1938, esp. Chapter I, and compare with the context of Leibniz’s terms as expounded e.g. in H. Hermes, ‘Die ars inveniendi und die ars iudicandi’ [Ars inveniendi and ars iudicand’], Studia Leibnitiana Suppl. III, Wiesbaden 1969.

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  3. Most prominent the collection of essays by J. Habermas, Zur Rekonstruktion des historischen Materialismus [On the Reconstruction of Historical Materialism].Frankfurt 1976.

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  4. H. Wohlrapp, Analytischer versus konstruktiver Wissenschaftsbegriff [‘Analytic versus Constructive Concept of Science’], Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie VI (1975).

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  5. Representative of the treatment in the last Chapter of W. V. O. Quine, Word and Object, Cambridge, Mass. 1960, §56 (Semantic Ascent).

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  6. Cf. the sophisticated treatment of the empirical core (= empirical content) of a theory via Sneed’s criteria of theoreticity as expounded e.g. in W. Stegmüller, Probleme und Resultate der Wissenschaftstheorie und Analytischen Philosophie [Problems and Results of the Philosophy of Science and Analytical Philosophy], vol. II, 2. Halbband, Chapter VIII, Heidelberg-New York 1973.

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  7. Cf. P. F. Strawson, op. cit.

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  8. Cf. K. Lorenz, ‘On the Relation between the Partition of a Whole into Parts and the Attribution of Properties to an Object’, Studia logica 36 (1977).

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  9. Cf. the discussion of the interrelation between explanation and induction in C. G. Hempel, Aspekte wissenschaftlicher Erklärung, Berlin-New York 1977 (German translation of a revised version of the last Chapter in C. G. Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science, New York 1965 ).

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  10. Cf. for comparison the related remarks on the difference between descriptive and explanatory adequacy of a theory, here: of linguistics, in N. Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge, Mass. 1965, chap. I (Methodological Preliminaries).

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  11. For further constructions in order to reach the usual level of syntactic differentiation, cf. K. Lorenz, ‘Words and Sentences. A Pragmatic Approach to the Introduction of Syntactic Categories’, Communication and Cognition 9 (Gent 1976 ).

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  12. Cf. his arguments in Against Method (London 1975) using examples from the history of science and of myths for the impossibility to achieve a unique (if not true) world representation.

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  13. Cf. Russell’s Logical Atomism, ed. and with an introduction by D. Pears, London 1972.

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© 1979 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland

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Lorenz, K. (1979). The Concept of Science. Some Remarks on the Methodological Issue ‘Construction’ Versus ‘Description’ in the Philosophy of Science. In: Bieri, P., Horstmann, RP., Krüger, L. (eds) Transcendental Arguments and Science. Synthese Library, vol 133. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9410-2_13

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9410-2_13

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-277-0964-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-9410-2

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