Abstract
In his interesting and insightful paper, Jude P. Dougherty trenchantly asserts the claims of an updated Aristotelian realism against the conceptual idealism that is a recurrent theme in my books. Dougherty focusses the issues around the following question:
The vocabulary of empirical science abounds in dispositional terms such as “elastic,” “conduction of heat” … and the like. Are these features not as real as any property we may predicate?
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© 1979 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Rescher, N. (1979). Reply to Dougherty. In: Sosa, E. (eds) The Philosophy of Nicholas Rescher. Philosophical Studies Series in Philosophy, vol 15. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9407-2_16
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9407-2_16
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