The Relation Between Philosophy of Science and History of Science

Abstract

In the heat of a debate, it is often hard to see how one-sided and sometimes foolish the opposed positions are. The debate on the relation of the history of science to the philosophy of science is so patently an unreasonable one that one has to step back to see it in its full absurdity. Further, in order to understand why reasonable and often intellectually superior people have been caught in this absurdity, it will help to examine the alternative positions and to suggest how and why they developed as they did, both conceptually and historically.

Earlier versions of this paper were given at Queens College of the City University of New York (in December, 1973) and at the London School of Economics (in May 1974). On these occasions, I benefited from the remarks and criticisms of many colleagues and especially Benjamin Nelson and J. W. N. Watkins (the severity of whose criticism was tempered by his graciousness). I also want to thank my colleague Robert S. Cohen, for many helpful criticisms and suggestions, which led to several revisions of earlier drafts. But I especially want to thank Imre Lakatos for all the fun we had together, puzzling about and arguing some of these issues. I miss his responses and his wit very badly, and it is harder to think about these things without him.