Models pp 12-23 | Cite as

Reduction, Explanation and Ontology

  • Marx W. Wartofsky
Part of the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science book series (BSPS, volume 48)


In recent discussion of reduction in the sciences and its philosophical interpretation, the point has been made in different ways (by Carnap,1 Nagel,2 Quine,3 Oppenheim and Putnam,4 Bunge,5 Popper,6 and Hospers,7 among others) that reductive explanation does not necessarily entail ontological reduction, that what is reductively explained is not necessarily explained away, and that reduction is not simply a case of elimination of the reference of reduced terms or reduced theories.


Ontological Commitment Ontological Status Extensional Identity Ontological Question Reductive Explanation 
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© D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland 1979

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  • Marx W. Wartofsky

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