Abstract
The inability of European statesmen to create a stable political and economic order from 1919 to 1924 has generally been attributed to German unwillingness to comply with the terms of the peace treaty. Contemporary politicians and later historians have argued that the period of extreme nationalistic agitation and continuing political struggle inflicted upon the people of Europe was basically caused by the wickedness of German political leaders and industrialists who attempted to evade the obligations imposed upon their country by the victorious powers. This long-suffering-creditor and dishonest-debtor theory certainly possesses a charming simplicity, but it is an oversimplification of complex economic and political problems which proves untenable if one examines it rigorously.
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References
Of the many studies written about Wilson’s policy the most important are Arno J. Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and Counterrevolution at Versailles 1918–1919 (New York, 1967).
Klaus Schwabe, Deutsche Revolution und Wilson Frieden. Die amerikanische und deutsche Friedensstrategie zwischen Ideologie und Machtpolitik (Düsseldorf, 1971).
Jean Baptiste Duroselle/Pierre Renouvin, Introduction to the History of International Relations (New York, 1967), pp. 281–290. For the influence of the balance-of-power concept upon Lloyd George see
Karl-Heinz Menzel, “Die Gebundenheit der britischen Aussenpolitik am Ende der Regierungszeit Lloyd Georges und ihre Auswirkungen auf Deutschland,” Phil. Diss. (Hamburg, 1951), pp. 15 ff.
Arno Wolfers, Britain and France between Two Wars. Conflicting Strategies of Peace from Versailles to World War II (New York, 1940).
W.M. Jordan, Great Britain, France and the German Problem 1918–1939 (London, 1943).
Neville Waites, (ed.), Troubled Neighbours. Franco-British Relations in the Twentieth Century (London, 1971).
An excellent study of the French press and of parliamentary discussions in France during the peace negotiations is Pierre Miquel, La Paix de Versailles et l’opinion publique française (Paris, 1972).
For the influence of public opinion on Allied statesmen cf: André Tardieu, La Paix (Paris, 1921) p. 322. Tardieu reports that in the light of the nationalistic spirit of the French Chamber reparations should be high.
Alfred Sauvy, Histoire Economique de la France entre les Deux Guerres 1918–1931 (Paris, 1965), pp. 38–44,
Alfred Sauvy, Histoire Economique de la France entre les Deux Guerres 1918–1931 (Paris, 1965), pp. 133–135. Sauvy describes the complete confusion of the French press towards postwar financial problems, and argues that French financial experts were unprepared to grasp the difficulties.
David Lloyd George, The Truth about the Peace Treaties, 2 vols. (London, 1938), I, pp. 461–467.
E.M. House/Charles Seymour, What really happened at Paris (London, 1921), pp. 622 if. On April 3, 1919a resolution signed by 270 M.P.’s was sent to Paris reminding Lloyd George that he had promised to extract total war costs from Germany. Davis, one of the American reparation experts at Versailles and later Undersecretary of State, noted in his diary: “The peoples in most of the countries and especially in France and England had been entirely misled as to Germany’s capacity to repair the damage she had done and in fact, as to the cost of such reparations which Germany, in the negotiations leading up to the Armistice, had agreed to make good.” “Peace Conference Notes, July 5, 1919,” Norman H. Davis Papers, Box 44. See also Clemenceau’s letter to Général Mordacq of May 30, 1919 where he stated: “Lloyd George, comme toujours, se laissait beaucoup trop influencer à cette conférence de la Paix, par les considérations de politique intérieure.” Quoted in Général Mordacq, Le Ministère Clemenceau. Journal d’un Témoin, t. 1–3 (Paris, 1930–1931), III, p. 298.
Arno J. Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and Counterrevolution at Versailles 1918–1919 (New York, 1967) Mayer, op. cit., pp. 156–158. “Peace Conference Notes, July 5 and 15, 1919,” Davis Papers, Box 44. Leonard P. Ayres reports that of all American advisers only Vance McCormick believed that the economic expectations of the political leaders were sound. “Memorandum on the American Attitude towards the Problem of Reparations during the Peace Conference,” Leonard P. Ayres Papers, Box 2,
Folder Misc. “American Committee to Negotiate Peace. Memos, Cables and Notes in Diary Form, March 20, 1919,” p. 46, Bernard Baruch Papers. Hereafter cited as Baruch Papers. Louis Loucheur, the French expert on the Committee agreed, but was afraid to support his American colleagues.
Cf. also David Lloyd George, The Truth about the Peace Treaties, 2 vols. (London, 1938), I, pp. 474. Lloyd George, op. cit., I, p. 474.
André Tardieu, The Truth about the Treaty (Indianapolis, 1921).
John Maynard Keynes, The Economic Consequences of Peace (New York, 1920).
For the French side see Pierre Miquel, La Paix de Versailles et l’opinion publique française (Paris, 1972). Miquel, op. cit., pp. 460–470.
“Peace Conference Notes. Annex. Arguments presented by Norman Davis on Behalf of Himself and Messrs. Montague, and Loucheur, at a Meeting with the President, Messrs. Lloyd George, and Clemenceau at Paris, March 15, 1919,” pp. 1–4, Davis Papers, Box 44; also “First Interim Report to the Commission on Reparations, by the 2nd Subcommittee, April 8, 1919,” p. 4, Baruch Papers, American Committee to Negotiate Peace. Alfred Sauvy, Histoire Economique de la France entre les Deux Guerres 1918–1931 (Paris, 1965), pp. 38–44, op. cit., reports that Loucheur’s acceptance of this sum was kept secret from the French public.
“Peace Conference Notes. Annex…,” p. 3 f. Davis Papers, Box 44.
Germain Calmette, Recueil des Documents sur l’Histoire de la Question des Réparations 1919–1921 (Paris, 1924), pp. IX-XX,
Germain Calmette, Les dettes Interalliées (Paris, 1926), pp. 77–80.
Arno J. Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and Counterrevolution at Versailles 1918–1919 (New York, 1967), op. cit., p. 627.
Laszlo Zsigmond, Zur deutschen Frage 1918–1923 (Budapest, 1964), pp. 79–83.
This sudden change was apparently caused by an attack of Jan C. Smuts, Prime Minister of South Africa, upon Lloyd George’s reparation policy. See E.M. House, The Intimate Diary of Colonel House, ed. By Charles Seymour, 4 vols. (London, 1924), IV, p. 492. “Peace Conference Notes, July 5, 1919,” pp. 8–11, Davis Papers, Box 44. Lloyd George to George Ridell, November 30, 1918 and March 30, 1919,
George R. Ridell, Intimate Diary of the Peace Conference and after, 1918–1923 (New York, 1934), p. 3
George R. Ridell, Intimate Diary of the Peace Conference and after, 1918–1923 (New York, 1934), and p. 42.
Winston Churchill, The Aftermath (London, 1929), p. 944 f.
For French expectations cf. Pierre Miquel, La Paix de Versailles et l’opinion publique française (Paris, 1972), op. cit., pp. 426–33.
“Peace Conference Notes, July 5, 1919,” p. 12, Davis Papers, Box 44. Also Arno J. Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and Counterrevolution at Versailles 1918–1919 (New York, 1967), op. cit., p. 806.
Alfred Sauvy, Histoire Economique de la France entre les Deux Guerres 1918–1931 (Paris, 1965), pp. 136, op. cit.,
Klaus Schwabe, Deutsche Revolution und Wilson Frieden. Die amerikanische und deutsche Friedensstrategie zwischen Ideologie und Machtpolitik (Düsseldorf, 1971), op. cit., p. 474. Baruch-Henry White, March 12, 1919, Baruch Papers, American Committee to Negotiate Peace, Folder 8.
“Peace Conference Notes, July 5, 1919,” p. 1, Davis Papers, Box 44. Cf. also “The Reparation Problem 1921.” Address delivered to the League of Free Nations Association, March 12, 1921, John F. Dulles Papers, Box 8, Reparation Problem 1921. Interesting material about the purpose of French and British demands has been compiled by S.L. Bane/Ralph H. Lutz, eds., The Blockade of Germany after the Armistice 1918–1919 (Stanford, 1919), pp. 579 ff.
John Maynard Keynes, The Economic Consequences of Peace (New York, 1920), op. cit.
Etienne Mantoux, The Carthagenian Peace or the Economic Consequences of Mr. Keynes (London, 1946).
For the German attitude at Versailles see: Peter Krüger, Deutschland und die Reparationen 1918–1919. Die Genesis des Reparationsproblems in Deutschland zwischen Waffenstillstand und Versailler Friedensschluss (Stuttgart, 1973).
Leo Haupts, Deutsche Friedenspolitik 1918–1919. Eine Alternative zur Machtpolitik des Ersten Weltkriegs (Düsseldorf, 1976).
Max M. Warburg, Aus meinen Aufzeichnungen (New York, 1952), pp. 74–79.
J.M. Keynes, “Dr. Melchior: Ein besiegter Feind,” Vorträge und Aufsätze. Herausgegeben vom Verein für Hamburgische Geschichte, Bd. 15. Carl Melchior. Ein Buch des Gedenkens und der Freundschaft (Tübingen, 1967), pp. 1–35.
Klaus Schwabe, Deutsche Revolution und Wilson Frieden. Die amerikanische und deutsche Friedensstrategie zwischen Ideologie und Machtpolitik (Düsseldorf, 1971), op. cit., p. 526.
Paul von Schwabach, Aus meinen Akten (Berlin, 1927), pp. 370–376.
Hermann Bücher, Finanz- und Wirtschaftsentwicklung Deutschlands in den Jahren 1921 bis 1925 (Berlin, 1925), pp. 7–29.
Carl Bergmann, “Wie können wir den Gegnern die Kriegsschäden ersetzen”? January 4, 1919, Wilhelm Cuno Nachlaß, Archiv des Vorsitzenden des Direktoriums. Hereafter cited as Cuno Nachlaß. “Niederschrift über eine Besprechung betreffend der sich aus der Entsendung einer Finanzkommission nach Paris ergebenden Fragen,” March 27, 1919, Bundesarchiv Koblenz, R2/188. Hereafter cited as BA.
By May 1921 Germany would also be required to pay a first rate of 20 billion gold marks and pay the costs of the Allied occupation armies. Charles S. Maier, Recasting Bourgeois Europe. Stabilization in France, Germany, and Italy in the Decade after World War I (Princeton, 1975).
Etienne Weill-Raynal, Les Réparations Allemandes et la France, 3 vols. (Paris, 1947) vol. I, pp. 580 ff.
James McNaughton Hester, America and the Weimar Republic. A Study of the Causes and Effects of American Policy and Action in Respect to Germany, 1918–1925, (Ph. D. thesis Oxford, 1955).
Dieter Bruno Gescher, Die Vereinigten Staaten von Nordamerika und die Reparationen 1920–1924 (Bonn, 1956).
Werner Link, Die amerikanische Stabilisierungspolitik in Deutschland 1921–1932 (Düsseldorf, 1970).
Carl Bergmann, Der Weg der Reparationen (Frankfurt, 1926).
For Lloyd George’s proposals see for example: Foreign Office, Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939, First Series, vol. XV (London, 1967), No. 8, pp. 39 ff. (Hereafter cited as DBFP). Weill-Reynal, op. cit., I. pp. 594–598.
Dieter Bruno Gescher, Die Vereinigten Staaten von Nordamerika und die Reparationen 1920–1924 (Bonn, 1956), op. cit., pp. 49–50,
Dieter Bruno Gescher, Die Vereinigten Staaten von Nordamerika und die Reparationen 1920–1924 (Bonn, 1956), op. cit., pp. 60.
Also Francis W. Hirst, The Consequences of the War to Great Britain (London, 1934), pp. 258 ff.
Alfred Maizels, Industrial Growth and World Trade. An Empirical Study of the Trends in Production, Consumption and Trade in Manufacturers from 1899–1959 with a Discussion of probable future Trends (Cambridge, 1963), pp. 92–98,
Alfred Maizels, Industrial Growth and World Trade. An Empirical Study of the Trends in Production, Consumption and Trade in Manufacturers from 1899–1959 with a Discussion of probable future Trends (Cambridge, 1963), pp. 220
and passim. Sidney Pollard, The Development of the British Economy 1914–1967, 2nd ed. (London, 1969), pp. 110–125. Already in February 27, 1919, the French Minister of Finance, Lucien Klotz, had declared that “French taxpayers would not be asked to pay anything before Germany had been charged the maximum of which she could pay.”
Pierre Miquel, La Paix de Versailles et l’opinion publique française (Paris, 1972) Cf. Miquel, op. cit., p. 446. A similar statement was made by Paul Doumer, Minister of Finance in the Briand cabinet: “If any bankruptcy was to take place, he did not think that it was fair that it should be France that should incur such bankruptcy in order that Germany should escape paying this 12 billions per annum for the war.” DBFP, vol. XV, No. 5 p. 39 f.
Carl Bergmann, “Wie können wir den Gegnern die Kriegsschäden ersetzen”? January 4, 1919 Bergmann, op. cit., p. 102 f.
Sally Marks, “Reparations: A Reminder,” Central European History 2 (1969), pp. 356–365 believes that the Allies tried to mislead public opinions on purpose.
Her views have been severely and justly criticized byDavid Felix, “Reparations Reconsidered with a vengeance,” Central European History ibid., 2 (1971), pp. 171–179.
See especially the opinion of James A. Logan and Maurice Frère. Gescher, op. cit., pp. 54 ff. “Notes by the Financial Secretary to the Treasury,” July 30,1923. Public Record Office, Offices of Imperial Defense, 24/161, CP. 358. Hereafter cited as Cab.
David Felix, Walt her Rathenau and the Weimar Republic: The Problem of Reparations (Baltimore and London, 1971);
Ernst Laubach, Die Politik der Kabinette Wirt h 1921–1922 (Lübeck and Hamburg, 1968).
Etienne Weill-Raynal, Les Réparations Allemandes et la France, 3 vols. (Paris, 1947) vol. II, Weill-Raynal, op. cit., II, pp. 28–68.
Ernst Laubach, Die Politik der Kabinette Wirt h 1921–1922 (Lübeck and Hamburg, 1968), op. cit., p. 73 f.
Alfred Sauvy, Histoire Economique de la France entre les Deux Guerres 1918–1931 (Paris, 1965), pp. 140 Sauvy, op. cit.,;
Richard Castillon, Les Réparations Allemandes. Deux Expériences 1919–1932, 1945–1952 (Paris, 1953), p. 43. Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Wirtschafts Reparationen, Abschluß von Abkommen mit Frankreich über Sachleistungen und Lauf der Sachlieferungen (Verhandlungen mit Tannery, Loucheur, Rathenau), November 10, 1921, K 444121–122. Hereafter cited as PA AA. Papers Relating to the Agreement between the French and German Governments concerning the application of Part VIII of the Treaty of Versailles Regarding Deliveries in Kind (London, 1921), p. 11 ff. For French industrial opposition cf. Le Matin, November 5, 1921. Echo de Paris, February 1, 1922.
Etienne Weill-Raynal, Les Réparations Allemandes et la France, 3 vols. (Paris, 1947) vol. II, Weill-Raynal, op. cit., II, pp. 28–68
Etienne Weill-Raynal, Les Réparations Allemandes et la France, 3 vols. (Paris, 1947) vol. II, op. cit., II, p. 59. L’Usine, September 17 and September 24, 1921, “L’Accord de Wiesbaden au point de vue des sinistrés et de l’industrie française.” Journée Industrielle, October 25, 1921. L’Industrie Chimique, September 9, 1921, L’Exportateur Français, September 15, 1921, “Les accords de Wiesbaden et l’exportation.” Bulletin Mensuel de la Chambre Syndicale des Constructeurs de Machines agricoles de France, no. 8, December 8, 1921. Journée Industrielle, July 21 and July 24, 1922, “La Réunion du Comité des Prestations en Nature.” L’Usine, July 27, 1922, Le Temps, November 1, 1922, and L’Echo Nationale, November 13, 1922.
For German industry see especially Jakob W. Reichert, Rathenau’s Reparationspolitik (Berlin, 1922).
Ernst Laubach, Die Politik der Kabinette Wirt h 1921–1922 (Lübeck and Hamburg, 1968), op. cit., pp. 61 ff,
Ernst Laubach, Die Politik der Kabinette Wirt h 1921–1922 (Lübeck and Hamburg, 1968), pp. 145 ff.
Julius Hirsch, Die deutsche Währungsfrage (Jena, 1924), pp. 58 ff.
Charles S. Maier, Recasting Bourgeois Europe. Stabilization in France, Germany, and Italy in the Decade after World War I (Princeton, 1975), op. cit., pp. 249 ff.
Etienne Weill-Raynal, Les Réparations Allemandes et la France, 3 vols. (Paris, 1947) vol. II Weill-Raynal, op. cit., II, pp. 85–96.
For the discussions see: DBFP, First Series, XV, No. 106, December 20, 1921; No. 108, December 21, 1921; No. 112–117, December 29–31, 1921.
Etienne Weill-Raynal, Les Réparations Allemandes et la France, 3 vols. (Paris, 1947) vol. II Weill-Raynal, op. cit., pp. 162–182. Mayer-AA, PA AA, Büro RM, Reparationen, October 28, 1922, D 718392. Ibid., October 5, 1922, D 718227–230. Ibid., December 2, 1922, D 718402–406.
Dieter Bruno Gescher, Die Vereinigten Staaten von Nordamerika und die Reparationen 1920–1924 (Bonn, 1956) Gescher, op. cit., p. 131.
Jean Loyrette, “The Foreign Policy of Poincaré: France and Great Britain in Relation with the German Problem 1919–1924,” (Ph.D. thesis, Oxford University, 1955), PP. 133–135. See the reports on the London conference of August 1922. Cab., 27/71, F.C. 40, July 31, 1922, and especially “Minutes of the London Conference on Reparations, August 1922,” Public Record Office, Foreign Office, 371/7486. Hereafter cited as FO.
Bradbury-Lloyd George, October 23, 1923, ibid., C 14869. Also David Felix, “Reparations Reconsidered with a vengeance,” Central European History ibid., 2 (1971), pp. 109, op. cit.,
Ernst Laubach, Die Politik der Kabinette Wirt h 1921–1922 (Lübeck and Hamburg, 1968) Laubach, op. cit., pp. 303–306.
Also J.W. Jenks-Edwin W. Kemmerer, January 26, 1923, Edwin W. Kemmerer Papers, Correspondence. Jenks believed that a unanimous report would have been possible. “It was our general opinion that if we had only three or four more days together, there would have been only one report, but as it was absolutely essential that Cassel and Keynes leave promptly, those of us who could handle English most readily got out one report as quickly as possible so that those two might sign it. The others preferred to state the subject in a somewhat different way, but there is little, if any difference in the fundamental principles.”
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Rupieper, H.J. (1979). Introduction: International Aspects of Reparations 1919–1922. In: The Cuno Government and Reparations 1922–1923. Studies in Contemporary History, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9284-9_1
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