The Decline of the London Government

  • George V. Kacewicz
Part of the Studies in Contemporary History book series (SICH, volume 3)

Abstract

Like his British hosts, Mikolajczyk hoped that ultimately it would be possible to reach an understanding with the Soviet Union and thus to preserve Polish independence. Not all of his colleagues shared his optimism. In fact, the signs of polarization within his government were becoming increasingly apparent. During a Cabinet debate on the demarcation line between the Soviet Union and Poland, which Mikolajczyk agreed in February should run east of Lwow, two Socialist Ministers, Ludwik Grosfeld and Jan Kwapinski, refused to support the motion. Many officials in Polish circles suspected that Mikolajczyk was going a little too far to accommodate himself to the British and Soviet points of view. The two viewpoints with regard to Soviet demands which always had been present within the Polish government, and to a lesser degree among the Poles in Great Britain, became more pronounced in the winter of 1944. One side, favoring concessions to the Kremlin if reconciliation were possible, was led by Mikolajczyk, with a majority of the Peasant Party and a sprinkling of Socialists. The other side maintained that concessions would be ineffectual and if they must be made, the Kremlin should reciprocate with concrete concessions of its own. This group included almost the entire armed forces, with Generals Kazimierz Sosnkowski and Wladyslaw Anders, President Wladyslaw Raczkiewicz, former Foreign Minister August Zaleski, former Polish Ambassador to France Juliusz Lukasiewicz, a majority of the Socialists, all the National Democrats, and a faction of the Peasant Party under Zygmunt Nagorski.1

Keywords

Europe Assure Hull Bark Dispatch 

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References

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Copyright information

© Martinus Nijhoff Publishers bv, The Hague 1979

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  • George V. Kacewicz

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