Advertisement

The Capitalist Corporation and the Socialist Firm

A Study of Comparative Efficiency
  • Svetozar Pejovich
Part of the Rochester Studies in Economics and Policy Issues book series (RSEP, volume 1)

Abstract

The Standard theory of production and exchange has provided fundamental insights into social problems that find their source in scarcity. It has demonstrated that, in a competitive equilibrium, the extent of exchange is consistent with the equimarginal principle. The theory has suggested testable implications for a number of world events and, most significantly, explained the efficiency characteristics of competitive markets.

Keywords

Transaction Cost Social Institution Capital Good Bank Credit Liquid Asset 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Notes

  1. 1.
    S. Cheung, “The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of a Non-exclusive Resource,” Journal of Law and Economics 13 (1970): 64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. 2.
    A. Alchian, “The Basis of Some Recent Advances in the Theory of Management of the Firm,” Journal of Industrial Economics 14 (1965): 30–41.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. 3.
    E. Furubotn and S. Pejovich, “Property Rights and Economic Theory,” Journal of Economic Literature 10 (1972): 1137–1162.Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    S. Gordon, “The Economie Theory and a Common Property Resource: Fishery,” Journal of Political Economy 62 (1970): 124–142.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. 5.
    A. Bottomley, “The Effect of the Common Ownership of Land upon Resource Allocation in Tripolitania,” Land Economics 39 (1963): 91–95.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. 6.
    S. MacCaulay, “Non-contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study,” American Sociological Review 28 (1963): 56–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. 7.
    For detailed discussion, see S. Pejovich, “Towards an Economic Theory of the Creation and Specification of Property Rights,” Review of Social Economy 30 (1972): 309–325.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. 8.
    See an excellent paper by A. Alchian and H. Demsetz, “Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization,” American Economic Review 62 (1972): 777–795.Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    A. Alchian, “Corporate Management and Property Rights,” in Economic Policy and the Regulation of Corporate Securities, ed. H. Manne (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1969). An excellent paper on the subject of the firm’s behavior is M.Jensen and W. Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure,” Journal of Financial Economics 3 (1976): 305-360, reprinted in this volume, pp. 163-231.Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    F. Pryor, Property and Industrial Organization in Communist and Capitalist Nations (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), chap. 7.Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    For detailed analysis, see E. Furubotn and S. Pejovich, “Property Rights and the Behavior of the Firm in a Socialist State,” Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie 30 (1970): 431–454.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. 12.
    S. Pejovich, “The Firm, Monetary Policy and Property Rights in a Planned Economy,” Western Economic Journal 7 (1969): 193–200.Google Scholar
  13. 13.
    S. Pejovich, “The Banking System and the Investment Behavior of the Yugoslav Firm,” in Plan and Market, ed. M. Bornstein (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1973).Google Scholar
  14. 14.
    F. Lutz and V. Lutz, The Theory of Investment of the Firm (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1951), p. 161.Google Scholar
  15. 15.
    W. Baumol, “The Transactions Demand for Cash: An Inventory Theoretical Approach,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 66 (1952): 545–556.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. 16.
    E. Furubotn and S. Pejovich, “ Property Rights, Economic Decentralization, and the Evolution of the Yugoslav Firm, 1965–1972,” Journal of Law and Economics 16 (1973): 275–302.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© University of Rochester Center for Research in Government Policy and Business 1979

Authors and Affiliations

  • Svetozar Pejovich

There are no affiliations available

Personalised recommendations