Abstract
The papers discussed in this sketch represent what I take to be a very exciting stream in recent work on conditionals. The first section includes two classics, Stalnaker’s ‘A Theory of Conditionals’ and Lewis’ ‘Counterfactuals and Comparative Possibility’, together with Stalnaker’s new paper ‘A Defence of Conditional Excluded Middle’. These papers contrast sharply with the earlier work of Goodman, Chisholm, and others, which attested to the problematic character of talk about alternative possibilities by drawing attention to the ambiguity and extreme context dependence of our linguistic intuitions about counterfactuals.1 Stalnaker and Lewis proceed by constructing abstract models that take as primitive the very sort of alternative possibilities that these earlier writers found problematic. They use these models to formulate new and interesting questions which can then be used to suggest examples on which to test linguistic intuitions. Whatever one thinks about the ultimate suitability of the possible worlds account, as an analysis of English conditionals, he must agree that the dispute between Stalnaker and Lewis in these papers has considerably sharpened and clarified our linguistic intuitions.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Bibliography
Adams, E.: 1965, ‘On the Logic of Conditionals’, Inquiry 8,166–197.
Adams, E.: 1966, ‘Probability and the Logic of Conditionals’, in J. Hintikka and P. Suppes (eds.), Aspects of Inductive Logic, North-Holland, 1966, pp. 265–316.
Adams, E.: 1970, ‘Subjunctive and Indicative Conditionals’, Foundations of Language 6, 39–94.
Adams, E.: 1975, The Logic of Conditionals, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, Holland.
Adams, E.: 1976, ‘Prior Probabilities and Counterfactual Conditionals’, in W. L. Harper and C. A. Hooker (eds.), Foundations of Probability Theory, Statistical Inference and Statistical Theories of Science, Volume I, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 1–21.
Carnap, R.: 1945, ‘The Two Concepts of Probability’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 5, 513–532.
Cramer, H.: 1955, The Elements of Probability Theory, John Wiley and Sons, New York.
De Finetti, B.: 1975, Theory of Probability, John Wiley and Sons, New York.
Ellis, B.: 1973, ‘The Logic of Subjective Probability’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 24 (2), 125–152.
Fetzer, J. and Nute, D.: 1979, ‘Syntax, Semantics, and Ontology: A Probabilistic Causal Calculus’, Synthese 40 (3), 453–495.
Gärdenfors, P.: 1978, ‘Conditionals and Changes of Belief’, Acta Philosophica Femica XXVIII (2–3), 381–404.
Gärdenfors, P.: 1979a, ‘Even If’, Manuscript.
Gärdenfors, P.: 1979b, ‘An Epistemic Approach to Conditionals’, Manuscript.
Gibbard, A.: 1979, ‘Two Recent Theories of Conditionals’, this volume, pp. 211–247.
Gibbard, A.: 1979, ‘Reply to Pollock’, this volume, pp. 253–256.
Gibbard, A. and Harper, W. L.: 1978, ‘Counterfactuals and Two kinds of Expected Utility’, in C. A. Hooker, J. J. Leach, and E. F. McClennen (eds.), Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory, Volume I, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, Holland, pp. 125–162
Gibbard, A. and Harper, W. L.: 1978, ‘Counterfactuals and Two kinds of Expected Utility’, in C. A. Hooker, J. J. Leach, and E. F. McClennen (eds.), Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory, Volume I, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, Holland, also this volume, pp. 153–190.
Harper, W. L.: 1974, Counterfactuals and Representations of Rational Belief Ph.D. Dissertation, Univeristy of Rochester.
Harper, W. L.: 1975, ‘Rational Belief Change, Popper Functions and Counterfactuals’, Synthese 30, 221; also reprinted 1976 in W. L. Harper and C. A. Hooker (eds.), Foundations of Probability Theory, Statistical Inference, and Statistical Theories of Science, Volume I, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 73–113.
Harper, W. L.: 1976, ‘Ramsey Test Conditionals and Iterated Belief Change’, in W. L. Harper and C. A. Hooker (eds.), Foundations of Probability Theory, Statistical Inference, and Statistical Theories of Science, Volume I, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 117–136.
Harper, W. L.: 1978, ‘Bayesian Learning Models with Revision of Evidence’, Philosophia, June 1978.
Harper, W. L.: 1979, ‘Conceptual Change, Incommensurability and Special Relativity Kinematics’, Acta Philosophical Fennica.
Harper, W. L., Leblanc, H., and van Fraassen, B.: 1979, ‘On Characterizing Popper and Carnap Probability Functions’, forthcoming.
Herzberger, H.: 1979. ‘Counterfactuals and Consistency’, Journal of Philosophy LXXVI (2), 83–88.
Kyburg, H. E.: 1974, ‘Propensities and Probabilities’, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 25, 358–375.
Kyburg, H. E.: 1976, ‘Chance’, Journal of Philosophical Logic 5, 355–393.
Levi, I.: 1977, ‘Subjunctive Dispositions and Chances’, Synthese 34, 423–455.
Lewis, D. K.: 1972, ‘Counterfactuals and Comparative Possibility’, Journal of Philosophical Logic 2, 418
D. Hockney, W. Harper, and B. Preed (eds.), Contemporary Research in Philosophical Logic and Linguistic Semantics, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, Holland, pp. 1–29
D. Hockney, W. Harper, and B. Preed (eds.), Contemporary Research in Philosophical Logic and Linguistic Semantics, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, Holland, and this volume, pp. 57–95.
Lewis, D. K.: 1973, Counterfactuals, Oxford.
Lewis, D. K.: 1975, ‘Probabilities of Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities’, The Philosophical Review LXXXV (3), 297–315
Lewis, D. K.: 1975, ‘Probabilities of Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities’, The Philosophical Review LXXXV (3), also this volume, pp. 129–147.
Lewis, D. K.: 1978, ‘Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance’, this volume, pp. 267–297.
Lewis, D. K.: 1979, ‘Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow’, Noûs XIII (4).
Mackie, J. L.: 1962, ‘Counterfactuals and Causal Forms’, in R. J. Butler (ed.), Analytical Philosophy.
Mackie, J. L.: 1973, Truth Probability and Paradox, Oxford University Press, New York.
Mellor, H.: 1971, The Matter of Chance, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England.
Pollock, J.: 1976, Subjunctive Reasoning, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, Holland.
Pollock, J.: 1978, ‘Indicative Conditionals and Conditional Probability’, this volume, pp. 249–252.
Popper, K. R.: 1959, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Harper Torchbook edition, New York.
Popper, K. R.: 1959, ‘The Propensity Interpretation of Probability’, The British Journal of the Philosophy of Science 10, 25–92.
Reichenbach, H.: 1949, The Theory of Probability, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles.
Skyrms, B.: 1977, ‘Resiliency, Propositions and Causal Necessity’, Journal of Philosophy 74,704–713.
Skyrms, B.: 1980, Causal Necessity, forthcoming Yale Press.
Skyrms, B.: 1979, ‘The Prior Propensity Account of Subjunctive Conditionals’, this volume, pp. 259–265.
Sobel, J. H.: 1979, ‘Probability, Chance and Choice’, working paper.
Stalnaker, R. C: 1968, ‘A Theory of Conditionals’, Studies in Logical Theory, American Philosophical Quarterly Monograph Series, No. 2, Blackwell, Oxford; in Ernest Sosa (ed.), Causation and Conditionals, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1975, Oxford; and this volume, pp. 41–55.
Stalnaker, R. C: 1970, ‘Probability and Conditionals’, Philosophy of Science 37, 1970
Stalnaker, R. C: 1970, ‘Probability and Conditionals’, Philosophy of Science 37, and this volume, pp. 107–127.
Stalnaker, R. C: 1975, ‘Indicative Conditionals’, Philosophia 5, 1975
Stalnaker, R. C: 1975, ‘Indicative Conditionals’, Philosophia 5, and this volume, pp. 193–210.
Stalnaker, R. C: 1976, ‘Letter to van Fraassen’, in W. L. Harper and C.A. Hooker (eds.), Foundations of Probability Theory, Statistical Inference, and Statistical Theories of Science, Volume I, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, Holland, p. 302.
Stalnaker, R. C: 1979, ‘A Defense of Conditional Excluded Middle’, this volume, pp. 87–104.
Stalnaker, R. C. and Thomason, R.: 1970, ‘A Semantical Analysis of Conditional Logic’, Theoria.
Thomason, R.: 1970, ‘A Fitch-Style Formulation of Conditonal Logic’, Logique et Analyse 52, 397–412.
Thomason, R. and Gupta, A.: 1979, ‘A Theory of Conditionals in the Context of Branching Time’, this volume, pp. 299–322.
van Fraassen, B.C.: 1974, ‘Hidden Variables and Conditional Logic’, Theoria 40.
van Fraassen, B. C: 1976a, ‘Probabilities of Conditionals’, in W. L. Harper and C. A. Hooker (eds.), Foundations of Probability Theory, Statistical Inference, and Statistical Theories of Science, Volume I, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, Holland, pp. 262–300.
van Fraassen, B. C: 1976b, ‘Representations of Conditional Probabilities’, Journal of Philosophical Logic 5, 417–430.
van Fraassen, B. C: 1977, ‘Relative Frequencies’, Synthese 34,133–166.
van Fraassen, B. C: ‘A Temporal Framework for Conditionals and Chance’, this volume, pp. 232–340.
Von Mises, R.: 1957, Probability Statistics and Truth, Macmillan, New York.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1980 D. Reidel Publishing Company
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Harper, W.L. (1980). A Sketch of Some Recent Developments in the Theory of Conditionals. In: Harper, W.L., Stalnaker, R., Pearce, G. (eds) IFS. The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, vol 15. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9117-0_1
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9117-0_1
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-277-1220-2
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-9117-0
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive