Lehrer on Action, Freedom and Determinism

Abstract

Keith Lehrer is a compatiblist. That is a biographical fact. What makes this fact philosophically interesting is not merely that it happens to be true but that the Lehrer version of compatiblism is based on logically tight and philosophically compelling arguments that are in turn attuned to careful analyses of ‘can’ ‘could’, and other pivotal items in the vocabulary of arguments on the controversial subject of freedom and determinism. Therefore in assessing his contributions, I propose that we look to the heart of these matters, to the analysis of ‘can’ and ‘could’, to the intricacies of the language of ifs and cans. It is in these inner workings and analytical turnings that the most lasting, fundamental contributions are to be found. Indeed, in the volatile swirls of philosophical battle over the booby-trapped landscape of ifs and cans it is hard to find many contributions that have established fixed landmarks that could be held and further fortified. Austin (1956) opened up the field for investigations, but his own contributions tended to the negative and critical — ‘can’ is “seminal” and “protean”, the frog at the bottom of the beer mug, grinning up at our efforts, a murky cluster of ill-defined meanings.

I would like to thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for a Research Grant that helped to support work on this paper.