Modern Logic — A Survey pp 353-375 | Cite as

# Inductive Logic 1945–1977

## Abstract

The seventeenth century saw the beginnings of two powerful and important ways of conceiving one proposition to support another in cases where the truth of the former is formal-logically consistent with the falsehood of the latter. Early in the century Francis Bacon urged the possibility of discovering causal uniformities from tables of presence and absence — lists of circumstances present, and circumstances absent, when the phenomenon under investigation was found. Bacon thought that natural laws which were so discovered would become more and more certain as they increased in comprehensiveness and subsumed a greater and greater variety of know uniformaities, provided that these laws also lead us to new knowledge. A little later Pascal and Fermat laid down principles for a mathemaical calculus of chance that Leibniz and Bermoulli interpreted as binding normal judgements of probability — in law courts, for example, as well as in games of chance.

## Keywords

Modal Logic Relevant Variable Inductive Logic Inductive Probability Singular Proposition## Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

## References

- Letter to Couring, March 19, 1678, in
*Die philosophischen Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz*, ed. by C. I. Gerhardt, Vol. 1, 1875, p. 195f.Google Scholar - D. Hume,
*A Treatise of Human Nature*, 1739, Bk I, Pt. III, Sec. X I.Google Scholar - E.g. P. S. de Laplace,
*A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities*, tr. F. W. Truscott and F. L. Emory, 1951, Pt. II, Ch. ix.Google Scholar - E.g. James Bernoulli, letter to Leibniz of April 20,1704, in
*Leibnizens mathematische Schriften*, ed. by C. I. Gerhardt, Vol. Ill, 1855, p. 87f.Google Scholar *The Principles of Science*: A Treatise on Logic and Scientific Method, 1874, Vol. I, p. 276ff.Google Scholar- A Treatise on Probability,1921.Google Scholar
*Le probléme logique de I’induction*, 1924, Eng. transl. in*Foundations of Geometry and Induction*, 1930.Google Scholar- Studies in the Logic of Confirmation’,
*Mind*liv, 1945, p. Iff and p. 97f.Google Scholar - E.g. I. Scheffler,
*The Anatomy of Inquiry*, 1963, p. 289.Google Scholar - E.g. J. L. Mackie, ‘The Paradoxes of Confirmation’
*British Journal for Philosophy of Science***13**(1963), 265–77.CrossRefGoogle Scholar - Cf. also the rather more ad hominem argument that Goodman’s solution is intrinsically incoherent: A. Zabludowski, ‘Concerning a fiction about how facts are forecast’,
*Journal of Philosophy***lxxi**(1974), p. 97ff.Google Scholar *Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief*, 1961, pp. 196–9.Google Scholar- In R. Carnap and R. C. Jeffrey (eds.),
*Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability*, Vol. I, 1971, p. 227ff.Google Scholar *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, 1959, For Popper’s ‘degree of corroboration’ as a measure of acceptability cf. pp. 388, 392, 394, etc.Google Scholar- Towards a Theory of Inductive Generalisation’, in
*Proceedings of the 1964 International Congress for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science*, pp. 274–288.Google Scholar - E.g. I. Niiniluoto and R. Tuomela,
*Theoretical Concepts and Hypothetico-Inductive Inference*, 1973.Google Scholar - J. Hintikka and R. Hilpinen, ‘Knowledge, Acceptance and Inductive Logic’, in
*Aspects of Inductive Logic*, ed. by J. Hintikka and P. Suppes, 1966, pp. 1–20.Google Scholar - These appeals to intuition are referenced and criticised in L. Jonathan Cohen, ‘How Empirical is Contemporary Logical Empiricism?’,
*Philosophia***5**(1975), pp. 299–317.CrossRefGoogle Scholar - Cf. L. Jonathan Cohen,
*The Probable and the Provable*, 1977, Sees. 1–9.Google Scholar - S. Kripke, ‘Semantical analysis of modal logic I, normal propositional calculi’,
*Zeitschrift für mathematische Logic und Grundlagen der Mathematik***9**(1963), 67–96.CrossRefGoogle Scholar