Inductive Logic 1945–1977

  • L. Jonathan Cohen
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 149)


The seventeenth century saw the beginnings of two powerful and important ways of conceiving one proposition to support another in cases where the truth of the former is formal-logically consistent with the falsehood of the latter. Early in the century Francis Bacon urged the possibility of discovering causal uniformities from tables of presence and absence — lists of circumstances present, and circumstances absent, when the phenomenon under investigation was found. Bacon thought that natural laws which were so discovered would become more and more certain as they increased in comprehensiveness and subsumed a greater and greater variety of know uniformaities, provided that these laws also lead us to new knowledge. A little later Pascal and Fermat laid down principles for a mathemaical calculus of chance that Leibniz and Bermoulli interpreted as binding normal judgements of probability — in law courts, for example, as well as in games of chance.


Modal Logic Relevant Variable Inductive Logic Inductive Probability Singular Proposition 
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Copyright information

© D. Reidel Publishing Company 1981

Authors and Affiliations

  • L. Jonathan Cohen
    • 1
  1. 1.The Queens CollegeOxfordEngland

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