The traditional alternative to the causal theory of perception is phenomenalism. Phenomenalism and the causal theory are generally regarded as competing theories of perception. In the following chapter, I shall propose a strictly epistemological form of phenomenalism which is compatible with the causal theory and can be combined with it so as to yield a plausible, unified theory of perception. First, however, we must examine the two standard forms of phenomenalism: ontological phenomenalism and analytical phenomenalism. This is the task of the present chapter. Sections 1 and 2 will be devoted to ontological phenomenalism, and Section 3 to analytical phenomenalism. Since analytical phenomenalism overlaps to a certain extent with our own strictly epistemological phenomenalism, the discussion of analytical phenomenalism will be carried over into the following chapter as well.
KeywordsPerceptual Experience Causal Theory Material Thing Physical Thing Logical Construction
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