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Logic and the Theory of Scientific Change

  • V. N. Sadovsky
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 145)

Abstract

The discussion of J. Sneed’s and W. Stegmüller’s logical reconstruction of Kuhn’s conception of sciences change leads inevitably to the formulation of more general questions such as: what form, from the modern point of view, should be characteristic of the theory of change of scientific theories? What role belongs to logic, logical formalization of the content (intuitive) sentences of this theory during construction of such a theory? Certainly, these questions are not new. They essentially touch upon the central problems of the philosophy of science, and each influential methodological conception provided its own answer. And the rational reconstruction of Kuhn’s views developed by Sneed and Stegmüller and, in particular, the discussion of these issues between Kuhn, Sneed and Stegmüller that took place in 1975 at the Fifth International Congress of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science shed new light on these topics which are fundamental for the philosophy and history of science. Thus it is appropriate to consider this continuing discussion.

Keywords

Scientific Knowledge Scientific Theory Scientific Change Rational Reconstruction Standard Conception 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© D. Reidel Publishing Company 1980

Authors and Affiliations

  • V. N. Sadovsky
    • 1
  1. 1.Institute for Systems StudiesMoscowRussia

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